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On 8 February 1868, the newly installed Meiji Government of Japan issued 
its proclamation nr 5. In this proclamation, it declared that it would honor 
the treaties that had been concluded between Japan and states in Europe and 
North America since 1854, but that it would also seek their revision in ac-
cordance with ‘universal public law’ 宇内の公法 (udai no kōhō). On behalf 
of the government, Higashikuze Michitomi 東久世通禧, then in office as 
Director General Agency for Foreign Affairs 外国事務総督 (Gaikoku Jimu 
Sōtoku), communicated the contents of the proclamation to foreign diplo-
matic envoys then accredited in Japan.2 The proclamation thus articulated 
the perception that there was a hierarchy of two legal frameworks that could 
be addressed for different, if not mutually exclusive purposes. Within this 
																																								 																				
1 Paper read to the Historical Institute of the University of Greifswald, 24 April 2017. 
2 GENERAL AGENCY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 外国事務総督 (Gaikoku Jimu Sōtoku): “Gaikō 
ni kan suru Fukokusho 外交に関スル布告書” (Government Proclamation Relating to 
Diplomacy [dated 8 February 1868 = 15th day of the first month of year Keio 4, 
concerning the treaties between Japan and other states, written by ŌKUBO Toshimichi 大
久保利道 and MUTSU Munemitsu 陸奥宗光]), Dai Nihon gaikō monjo 大日本外交文書 
(Diplomatic Records of Japan), nr 97, vol. 1, Nihon Kokusai Kyōkai 日本国際協会 
1938: 227–28. HIGASHIKUZE Michitomi: Nikki 日記 (Diary), vol. 1, Kasumi Kaikan 霞
会館 1992: 521 [entry on 12 February 1868 = 19th day of the first month of year Keio 4]. 
The US envoy reported the communication on 16 February 1868. See Payson Jackson 
TREAT: Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Japan, vol. 1, Stanford and 
London: Stanford University Press 1932: 344 [reprint, Glocester, MA: Smith 1963]. For a 
comment see OWADA Hisashi [小和田恒]: “Japan, International Law and the International 
Community”, ANDŌ Nisuke [安藤仁介] (ed.): Japan and International Law, The Hague, 
London and Boston: Kluwer 1999: 347–78, at 351. 
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hierarchy, the treaties represented the lower level featuring specifically set 
stipulations that might be laid down in writing and were regarded as binding. 
Yet the binding force of these specific statutory stipulations was to emerge 
from the higher level of non-statutory unwritten legal rules and these rules 
were to be used not only to the end of enforcing but also for the purpose of 
revising specific stipulations. The perception in Japan of a hierarchy of non- 
statutory unwritten leges generales positioned above written statutory leges 
speciales3 was virtually equivalent of the distinction between natural and 
positive law as part and parcel of European theory of international law up 
until the early nineteenth century.4 By contrast, European theorists of inter-
national law as well as foreign-policy decision-makers in government have, 
since the turn of the nineteenth century, operated under the expectation that 
international law could only be established and enforced in some specific 
“legal community”, whose members were to be selected from a number of 
states in America and Europe.5 In taking this stance, they rejected the pre-
																																								 																				
3 The distinction was applied retrospectively by TABATA Shigejirō 田畑茂二郎 : 
“Kokusaihō chitsujo no tagenteki kōsei” 国際法秩序の多元的構成  (The Pluralist 
Structure of the International Order), in: Hōgaku ronsō 法学論叢 (Legal Debates), vol. 
47 (1942): 383–402, vol. 48 (1943): 349–74, 908–34, at: 388–89. 
4 For general treatises on the application of natural law theory to international law in the 
eighteenth century see Gottfried ACHENWALL: Juris naturalis pars posterior, Göttingen: 
Bossiegel 1763 [seventh edn, ibid. 1774]. ACHENWALL: Juris gentium Europaearum prac-
tici primae lineae fragmentum libelli, Göttingen: Bossiegel 1775. Joachim Georg DARJES: 
Observationes ivris naturalis, socialis et gentium ad ordinem systematis svi selectae, Jena: 
Güth 1751. DARJES: Discours über sein Natur- und Völkerrecht, Jena: Hartung 1762. 
5 For general legal theory see Friedrich Carl von SAVIGNY: Vom Beruf unsrer Zeit für 
Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft, Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer 1814 [second edn, 
ibid. 1828; third edn, ibid. 1840; new edn of the third edn, Freiburg: Mohr 1892; reprints 
of the first edn, Hildesheim and New York: Olms 1973; Goldbach: Keip 1997 (100 Jahre 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Pandektenrecht 54)]. Georg Friedrich PUCHTA: Gewohnheits-
recht, 2 vols, Erlangen: Palm 1828–1837, vol. 1: 143–47, vol. 2: 7–8 [reprint, Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1965]. PUCHTA: Pandekten, second, enlarged edn, 
Leipzig: Barth 1844: 16–7 [reprint of this edn, Frankfurt: Vico 2008; first published, 
Leipzig: Barth 1838); third edn, ibid. 1845; fourth edn, ibid. 1848; fifth edn, ibid. 1850; 
sixth edn, ibid. 1852; seventh edn, ibid. 1853; eighth edn, ibid. 1856; ninth edn, ibid. 1863; 
tenth edn, ibid. 1866; eleventh edn, ibid. 1872; twelfth edn, Berlin and Leipzig: Barth 
1877; reprint of this edn, Goldbach: Keip 1999]. For international legal theory see Henry 
WHEATON: Elements of International Law, §§ 9–11, London: Fellowes and Philadelphia: 
Carey, Lee & Blanchard 1836: 44–6 [third US edn, Philadelphia: Lee & Blanchard 1846; 
new edn by William Beach LAWRENCE, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1855; second edn of 
the edn by LAWRENCE, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. and London: Low 1863; eighth edn, 
edited by Richard Henry DANA, Boston: Little, Brown & Co. and London: Sampson & 
Low 1866; new edn of the English edn, edited by Alexander Charles BOYD, London: 
Stevens 1878; second edn of the edn by BOYD, London: Stevens 1880; third edn of the edn 
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vious eighteenth-century position that international law was part of natural 
law and that the universal non-institutionalized civitas maxima was to be 
accepted as the framework through which international legal rules were part 
of the ordered world.6 Throughout the nineteenth century, there was thus a 
clash of perceptions between adherents to positivist theory of international 
law in America and Europe, on the one side, and, on the other, government 
policy-makers not merely in Japan but also elsewhere in the world, about 
who preferred to adhere to their established natural legal norms for their 
conduct of international relations.7 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
by Alexander Charles BOYD, ibid. 1889; fourth edn of the English edn, edited by James 
Beresford ATLAY, ibid. 1904; fifth edn of the English edn, edited by Coleman PHILLIPSEN, 
ibid. 1916; sixth edn of the English edn, edited by Arthur Berriedale KEITH, ibid. 1929; 
reprints of the original edn, New York: Da Capo Press 1972; Clark, NJ: Lawbook 
Exchange 2012; reprint of the edn by Dana, edited by George Crafton WILSON, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1936; reprint of this reprint, New York: Da Capo Press 1972; 
reprint of the original edn by Dana, New York: Da Capo Press 1991]. For a recent 
restatement of the principle see Urs Matthias ZACHMANN: Völkerrechtsdenken und Außen-
politik in Japan. 1919–1960, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2013 (Studien zur Geschichte des 
Völkerrechts, 29): 51–68 [Habilitationsschrift Munich University, 2010 s.t.: ‘Krieg und 
Ordnungsdenken im japanischen völkerrechtlichen Diskurs 1919–1960. Studien zur 
Geistesgeschichte der Zwischen- und frühen Nachkriegszeit’]. For studies on customary 
law see Christoph KLETZER: “Custom and Positivity. An Examination of the Philosophic 
Ground of the Hegel–Savigny Controversy”, James Bernard MURPHY (ed.): The Nature of 
Customary Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007: 125–48. Michael LOBBAN: 
“Custom, Law and Common Law Reasoning and the Law of Nations in the Nineteenth 
Century”, ibid.: 256–78. For similar statements emerging from diplomatic correspondence 
see George MACARTNEY: “[Confirmation of the Receipt of the Instruction Given to Him 
on the occasion of his Mission to China, 4 January 1792; Ms. London: India Office, 
China-Macartney, 6/12/9]”, edited by Alain PEYREFITTE: L’empire immobile. Ou Le choc 
des mondes, Paris: Fayard 1989: 107. MACARTNEY: An Embassy to China. Being the 
Journal Kept by Lord Macartney during His Embassy to the Emperor Ch’ien-lung. 
1793–1794, Nr XXVI, edited by John Lancelot CRANMER-BYNG (Britain and the China 
Trade, 8), London and New York: Routledge 2000: 95, 167 [first printing of this edn, 
London: Longman 1962]. John Lancelot CRANMER-BYNG: “Lord Macartney’s Embassy to 
Peking in 1793. From Official Chinese Documents”, Journal of Oriental Studies, vol. 4, 
issues 1-2 (1957/58): 117–87, at 145, 156–58. 
6 Christian WOLFF: Jus Gentium methodo scientifico pertractatvm, §§ 8–12, 16, Halle: 
Rengger 1749: 6–10, 12 [reprint, edited by Marcel THOMANN, Hildesheim and New York: 
Olms 1972 (Wolff, Gesammelte Werke, Part B, vol. 25)]. Emèrita de VATTEL: Le droit des 
gens. Ou Principes de la loi naturelle appliqués à la conduite et aux affairs des nations et 
des souverains, Préliminaires, § 11, London [recte Neuchâtel]: s.n. 1758: 7 [reprint, edited 
by Albert de LAPRADELLE, Washington: Carnegie Institute 1916; reprint of the reprint, 
Geneva: Slatkine 1983]. 
7 Samuel MAHARERO: [Letter to Theodor Leutwein, Governor of German Southwest Africa, 
6 March 1904], Paul ROHRBACH, Deutsche Kolonialwirtschaft, Berlin: Verlag “Die Hilfe” 
1907: 333–34 [English version edited by Jeremy SILVESTER and Jan-Bart GEWALD: Words 
 Harald Kleinschmidt 
Japonica Humboldtiana 20 (2018) 
124 
One of the factors distinguishing naturalist from positivist theory of inter-
national law related to the perception of states as autonomous institutions of 
governance. Within the natural law tradition, in Europe as well as elsewhere 
in the world, the autonomy and the rights of states counted as givens for the 
entire world and as parts of the civitas maxima by “natural” endowment, that 
is, by virtue of their being states. By consequence, there was neither a need 
of specific stipulations of sovereign rights nor was there a demand for spe-
cific processes of admission or recognition of states.8 By contrast, propo-
nents of the positivist theory of international law maintained that the postu-
lated “international legal community” as the agent establishing and enforc-
ing international law was to be regarded as the result of purposeful legal acts, 
first constituting that very community and then regulating access to it of 
further members.9 In other words, positivists constituted the “international 
legal community” as an exclusionist club of states with restricted member-
ship and limited access rights. Within positivist theory of international law, 
thus, access to the “community” was to be open to states outside America 
and Europe solely on the ground of the recognition through acts of grace by 
governments of member states, with the qualification that newly to be ad-
mitted states should comply with some imagined standard of “civiliza-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Cannot be Found. German Colonial Rule in Namibia. An Annotated Reprint of the 1918 
Blue Book, Leiden: Brill 2004: 99–100]. Hendrik WITBOOI: [Letter to Maharero 
Tyamuaha, Hornkranz, 30 May 1890], WITBOOI, Afrika den Afrikanern! Aufzeichnungen 
eines Nama-Häuptlings aus der Zeit der deutschen Eroberung Südwestafrikas, 1884–1894, 
edited by Wolfgang REINHARD, Berlin and Bonn: Dietz 1982: 89–93 [first printed, WIT-
BOOI: De dagboek van Hendrik Witbooi, Cape Town: Van Ribeeck Society 1929; English 
version, The Hendrik Witbooi Papers, edited by Annemarie HEYWOOD, Eben MAASDORP 
and Brigitte LAU, second edn, Windhoek: National Archives of Namibia 1995; first edn of 
this edn, ibid. 1989; also, SILVESTER: Words (as above): 36–7]. 
8 WITBOOI: Letter (note 7). WOLFF: Ius (note 6): 6–9. Cf. Jochen Graf von BERNSTORFF: The 
Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen. Believing in Universal Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2000: 108–18 [first published, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001 
(Studien zur Geschichte des Völkerrechts, 2)]. 
9 Heinrich TRIEPEL: Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, Leipzig: Hirschfeld 1899: 76, 80–1 [new 
edn, Tübingen: Mohr & Siebeck 1907; reprint, Aalen: Scientia 1958; French version, Pa-
ris: Pédone 1920]. For studies of the concept of the international legal community see: 
BERNSTORFF: Law (note 7): 26–41, 108–18. Randall LESAFFER: Europa. Een zoektocht 
naar vrede. 1453–1763 en 1945–1995. Ph.D. Thesis, University of Leuven 1999: 
375–441. Ian CLARK: International Legitimacy and World Society, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2007. Andreas L. PAULUS: Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht, 
Munich: Beck 2001 (Münchener Universitätsschriften, Reihe der Juristischen Fakultät 
159): 45–219. 
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tion”.10 Since the early nineteenth century, the concept of “civilization” has 
been a label conveying the belief that some patterns of the conduct of inter-
national relations and sets of cultural practices should be followed with the 
“international legal community” for the purpose of facilitating the generation 
and enforcement of international legal norms.11 Early in the nineteenth cen-
																																								 																				
10 Alexander Freiherr von SIEBOLD: Der Eintritt Japans in das europäische Völkerrecht, 
Berlin: Tamai 1900. Immanuel Chung-Yueh HSU: China’s Entrance in to the Family of 
Nations. The Diplomatic Phase. 1858–1880, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
1960 (Harvard East Asia Series, 5). Brett BOWDEN: The Empire of Civilization. The 
Evolution of an Imperial Idea, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2009: 103–27. 
Gerrit W. GONG: The Standard of “Civilization” in International Society. Ph.D. Thesis, 
typescript, University of Oxford 1980 [printed version, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1984]. 
GONG: “China’s Entry into International Society”, Hedley BULL and Adam WATSON 
(eds): The Expansion of International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1984: 
171–83 [another edn, ibid. 1985]. SUGANAMI Hidemi [菅波英美]: “Japan’s Entry into 
International Society”, BULL: Expansion (as above): 185–99. ZHANG Yong-jin: China in 
the International System. 1919–20, Basingstoke: Palgrave and New York: St Martin’s 
Press 1991. ZHANG: “China’s Entry into International Society. Beyond the Standard of 
‘Civilization’”, Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 3–16. 
11 See, among many, William Edward HALL: [A Treatise on] International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 1880: 100, 114–15, 125–27 [second edn, ibid. 1884; third edn, 
ibid. 1890; fourth edn, ibid. 1895; fifth edn, edited by James Beresford ATLAY, ibid. 
1904; sixth edn, edited by James Beresford ATLAY, ibid. 1909; seventh edn, edited by 
Alexander Pearce HIGGINS, ibid. 1917; eighth edn, edited by Alexander Pearce HIGGINS, 
ibid. 1924. Reprint of the eighth edn, Aalen: Scientia 1979]. For criticisms of the use of 
“civilization” as a technical legal term see: Antony ANGHIE: Imperialism, Sovereignty 
and the Making of International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005: 
53–65. Francisco Castilla URBANO: El pensiamento de Francisco de Vitoria, Barcelona: 
Anthropos 1992 (Pensiamento critico, pensiamento utópico, 69): 231–48. James 
CRAWFORD: The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press 1979: 177–81. GONG: Standard (note 9, typescript version): 61. Wil-
helm Georg Carl GREWE: Epochen der Völkerrechtsgeschichte, second edn (Ba-
den-Baden: Nomos 1988): 520–35 [Habilitationsschrift, University of Königsberg 1941; 
first, unpublished print, Leipzig 1945; first book trade edn, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1984; 
English version, Berlin: de Gruyter 2000]. Martti Antero KOSKENNIEMI: The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law. 1870–1960, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2002: 127–32 [fifth edn, ibid. 2008]. David LONG: 
“Paternalism and the Internationalization of Imperialism. J. A. Hobson on the 
International Government of the ‘Lower Races’”, LONG and Brian C. SCHMIDT (eds): 
Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations, Albany: 
State University of New York Press 2005: 71–92. Frédéric MÉGRET: “From ‘Savage’ to 
‘Unlawful Combatants’. A Post-Colonial Look at International Humanitarian Law’s 
‘Other’”, Anne ORFORD (ed.): International Law and Its Others, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2006: 265–317. Joachim MORAS: Ursprung und Entwicklung des Be-
griffs der Zivilisation in Frankreich (1756–1830), Hamburg: Seminar für Romanische 
Sprachen und Kultur 1930 (Hamburger Studien zu Volkstum und Kultur der Romanen, 
6): 6–9, 37–8. 
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tury, lawyer Theodor von Schmalz opined that nations without a civil society 
could not have knowledge of rights in landed property and should therefore 
classed as ‘hordes’ and concluded that such alleged ‘hordes’ could not be 
members of the “international legal community”.12 Later in the century, 
another lawyer, Arrigo Cavaglieri, concurred by stating matter-of-factly that 
the capability of protecting private property was the main indicator of “civi-
lization” and that groups of people portrayed as incapable of accomplishing 
this task could not be recognized as legal equals.13 With an eye on the deci-
sions of the Berlin Africa conference of 1884/5, his colleague Ferdinand von 
Martitz thus pontificated that ‘areas in which savages and semi-savages rove 
about cannot be treated as state territories’.14 Diplomat Henry Wheaton 
specified that only “the usage of civilized nations has established a certain 
etiquette, to be observed by the members of the diplomatic corps, resident at 
the same court, towards each other, and towards the members of the gov-
ernment to which they are accredited”.15 With characteristic candor, phi-
losopher John Stuart Mill seconded with the argument that, what he called 
“international morality” in the tradition of John Austin’s legal theory, de-
manded the recognition of the reciprocity of binding rights and obligations, 
He then added the warning: “To suppose that the same international customs, 
and the same rule of international morality, can obtain between one civilised 
nation and another, and between a civilised nation and barbarians, is a grave 
error, and one which no statesman can fall into. … In the first place, the 
rules of ordinary international morality imply reciprocity. But barbarians 
will not reciprocate. … In the next place, nations which are still barbarous 
have not got beyond the period during which it is likely to be for their bene-
fit that they should be conquered or held in subjection by foreigners.16 Mill 
																																								 																				
12 Theodor Anton Heinrich von SCHMALZ: Das europäische Völkerrecht, Berlin: Duncker 
& Humblot 1817: 4–5 [reprint, Frankfurt: Keip 1970]. 
13 Arrigo CAVAGLIERI: “La conception positive de la société internationale”, Revue 
générale de droit international public 18 (1911): 259–76, at 265. 
14  Ferdinand von MARTITZ: “Das Internationale System zur Unterdrückung des Afrikani-
schen Sklavenhandels in seinem heutigen Bestande”, Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 1 
(1885): 3–107, at 16–7. 
15 WHEATON: Elements, § 223 (note 5, edn of 1866): 251. 
16 John Stuart MILL: “A Few Words on Non-Intervention”, MILL: Dissertations and Dis-
cussions. Political, Philosophical and Historical, vol. 3, London: Parker 1867: 153–78, 
at 168 [second edn of this edn, London: Longman 1875; first published, Fraser’s Maga-
zine (1859); also, MILL: Essays on Politics and Culture, edited by Gertrude HIMMELFARB, 
Garden City: Doubleday 1963): 368–84; MILL: Essays on Equality, Law and Education, 
edited by John M. ROBSON (Mill, Collected Works, vol. 21), Toronto, Buffalo and 
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thus claimed a lack of governmentality in groups outside Europe and the 
American settler colonies and used this claim as an entitlement for colonial 
rule. At the end of the century, lawyer James Lorimer created the circular 
argument that the freedom of trade had to be conceded to British traders as 
the condition for the recognition of sovereign statehood and then insisted 
that international legal rules did not have to become applied to “savages”, 
because these groups could not be regarded as residing in states.17 In a sim-
ilar vein, his fellow lawyer Thomas Joseph Lawrence refused to recognize 
populations of allegedly migrant “tribes” as inhabitants of states and set 
“civilization” as the condition for the recognition of sovereignty.18 Even 
twentieth-century scholars did not hesitate to use the concept of “civiliza-
tion” as a technical term denoting the alleged condition for the admission of 
states into the “international legal community”.19 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
London: University of Toronto Press 1984: 109–24]. MILL: “Civilization [1836]”, MILL: 
Essays on Politics and Society, edited by John M. ROBSON, Toronto, Buffalo and Lon-
don: University of Toronto Press 1977 (Mill, Collected Works, vol. 18): 117–47. On 
these texts see Beate JAHN: “Barbarian Thought. Imperialism in the Political Philosophy 
of John Stuart Mill”, Review of International Studies 31 (2005): 599–618. JAHN: “Clas-
sical Smoke, Classical Mirror. Kant and Mill in Liberal International Relations Theory”, 
JAHN (ed.): Classical Theory in International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2006 (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 103): 178–203 [first pub-
lished as “Kant, Mill and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs”, International 
Organization 59 (2005): 177–207]. Georgios VAROUXAKIS: “John Stuart Mill on 
Intervention and Non-Intervention”, Millennium 26 (1997): 57–76. 
17 JAMES LORIMER: The Institutes of the Law of Nations, vol. 2, Edinburgh and London: 
Blackwood 1884: 27 [reprint, Aalen: Scientia 1980]. LORIMER: “La doctrine de la 
reconnaisance, fondament du droit international”, Revue de droit international et de 
législation comparée 16 (1884): 333–59, at 335. 
18 Thomas Joseph LAWRENCE: The Principles of International Law, §§ 44, 90, London and 
New York: Macmillan 1895: 58, 136 [second edn, ibid. 1895; third edn, London: 
Macmillan and Boston: Heath 1900; 1909; fourth edn, ibid. 1910; 1911; fifth edn, ibid. 
1913; sixth edn, ibid. 1915; seventh edn, edited by Percy H. WINFIELD, Boston: Heath 
1923]. Similarly Eduardo CIMBALI: Popoli barbari e popoli civili, second edn, Rome: 
Bocca 1891 [first published, ibid. 1887]. Giuseppe TRIONE: Gli stati civili nei loro rap-
porti giuridici coi popoli barbari e semibarbari, Turin: Bocca 1899 (Nuova collezione di 
opere giuridiche, 97). John WESTLAKE: Chapters on the Principles of International Law, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1894: 142–45, 177–78 [reprints, Littleton, CO: 
Rothmann 1982; Charleston: Bibliolife 2009; also reprinted, WESTLAKE: The Collected 
Papers on Public International Law, edited by Lassa Francis OPPENHEIM, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1914: 1–282]. 
19 Joseph Laurenz KUNZ: “Zum Begriff der ‘nation civilisée’ im modernen Völkerrecht”, 
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 7 (1928): 86–99, at 96. Dietrich SCHINDLER [the Youn-
ger]: “Völkerrecht und Zivilisation”, Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für internationales Recht 
13 (1956): 79–96. Paul REUTER: Introduction to the Law of Treaties, London: Pinter 
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In other words, admission into the “international legal community” as a 
club of states depended on the perception among governments of member 
states that the newly incoming states were structured as if they were states in 
America and Europe. If member state governments refused to grant the sta-
tus of ‘civilization’, admission was denied with the consequence that inter-
national legal norms and principles of the conduct of international relations 
were, if at all, not fully applied to non-members. Moreover, in American and 
European perspective, these non-members were deemed to become targets of 
“civilizing” measures20 or subject to direct or indirect colonial rule. With 
regard to Japan prior to 1868, some European governments, notably the 
British, the French and the Prussian, took the view that Japan might come 
under their colonial rule21 while from the 1870s, these designs gave way to 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
1989: 6 [second edn, London: Kegan Paul 1995; first published, Paris: Colin 1972]. 
Georg SCHWARZENBERGER: “The Standard of Civilization in International Law”, 
SCHWARZENBERGER and George Williams KEETON (eds): Current Legal Problems, vol. 8, 
London: Stevens 1955: 212–34, at 216. The legal dimension in contemporary attempts at 
the justification of colonial rule is usually underrepresented in economy-based analyses 
of the period of high imperialism, which seek to trace economic benefits of the super-
imposition of colonial rule for colonial centers. For a pioneering study see David Ken-
neth FIELDHOUSE: Economics and Empire. 1830–1914, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 
and Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1973: 21–2, 26, 32–3. For criticisms of this ap-
proach see Paul BAIROCH: Economics and World History, New York: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf and Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1993: 57–98, 173. Peer VRIES: 
Escaping Poverty. The Origins of Modern Economic Growth, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck 
& Ruprecht 2013: 271, 382–400. 
20 Boris BARTH and Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL (eds): Zivilisierungsmissionen. Imperiale Welt-
verbesserung seit dem 18. Jahrhundert, Constance: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft 2005. 
BOWDEN: Empire (note 10): 129–59. BOWDEN, Civilization and War, Cheltenham: Elgar 
2013. Gerrit W. GONG: “China’s Entry into International Society. Beyond the Standard 
of ‘Civilization’”, Review of International Studies 17 (1991): 3–16. Eric WEITZ: “From 
the Vienna to the Paris System. International Politics and the Entangled Histories of 
Human Rights, Forced Deportation and Civilizing Missions”, American Historical Re-
view 113 (2008): 1313–43. 
21  Maximilian August Scipio von BRANDT: [Memorandum Concerning Colonies in East 
Asia], January 1867, edited by Rolf-Harald WIPPICH, Japan als Kolonie? Max von 
Brandts Hokkaidô-Projekt 1865/67 (Übersee, 31), Hamburg: Abera 1997: 29–42. 
BRANDT: Dreiunddreißig Jahre in Ostasien, vol. 2, Leipzig: Wigand 1901: 148 [new edn, 
ibid. 1909; partly edited by Catharina BLOMBERG, The West’s Encounter with Japanese 
Civilization. 1800–1940, vol. 11, Richmond, SY: Japan Library 2000; reprint, Seoul: 
Kyŏngin Munhwasa 2001 (Kŭnse Tong Asea Sŏvangŏ Charvo Ch’angsŏ, 93); microfiche 
edn, Munich: Saur 2002 (German Books on Japan. 1477–1945, 1, 1)]. Thierry 
MORMANNE: “La prise de possession d’Urup par la flotte anglo-française en 1855”, 
Cipango 11 (2004): 209–36. Laurence OLIPHANT: Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mis-
sion to China and Japan in the Years 1857, ’58, ’59, vol. 2, Edinburgh and London: 
Blackwood 1859: 248–49 [another edn, New York: Harper 1860; reprints, New York: 
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policies aimed at the imposition upon Japan of “civilizing” measures to the 
end of transforming not merely the state structure but also basic patterns of 
Japanese culture.22 Extraterritoriality of law in conjunction with consular 
jurisdiction23 and the enforcement of export duties were the legal instru-
ments used to bully the Meiji government to accept ‘civilization’ as the main 
condition for the revision of the treaties that had been concluded since 
185424. Initially, the Meiji government responded to these forms of regime 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Kelley 1969; Hongkong: Oxford University Press 1970]. Bruno SIEMERS: “Preußische 
Kolonialpolitik 1861–62”, Nippon 3 (1937): 20–6. 
22 For a survey see Paul-Christian SCHENCK: Der deutsche Anteil an der Gestaltung des 
modernen japanischen Rechts- und Verfassungswesens, Stuttgart: Steiner 1997 (Beiträge 
zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte, 68). 
23 For contemporary explications with regard to East Asia see Alessandro PATERNOSTRO: 
“La révision des traités avec le Japon au point de vue du droit international”, Revue de 
droit international et de législation comparée 23 (1891): 5–29, 176–200. Francis Taylor 
PIGGOTT: Exterritoriality. The Law Relating to Consular Jurisdiction and to Residence in 
Oriental Countries, London: Clowes 1892 [second edn, London: Kelly & Walsh 1907]. 
Charles James TARRING: British Consular Jurisdiction in the East. With Topical Indices 
of Cases on Appeal from and Relating to Consular Courts and Consuls, also a Collection 
of Statutes Concerning Consuls, London: Stevens & Haynes 1887. Travers TWISS: On 
Consular Jurisdiction in the Levant and the Status of Foreigners in the Ottoman Law 
Courts, London: Clowes 1880 [another edn, ibid. 1880]. TWISS: On Consular Diction in 
Japan and the Recent Legislation of the Japanese Government, London: Clowes 1881. 
On Piggott see Carmen BLACKER: “Two Piggotts. Sir Francis Taylor Piggott 
(1852–1925) and Major General F.S.G. Piggott (1883–1966)”, Hugh CORTAZZI and 
Gordon DANIELS (eds): Britain and Japan. 1859–1991. Themes and Personalities, 
Richmond, SY: Japan Library 1991: 118–27. 
24 For studies on treaty revision see Tadao Johannes ARAKI: Geschichte der Entstehung und 
Revision der ungleichen Verträge mit Japan (1853–1894). Ph.D. Thesis, typescript, 
University of Marburg 1959. Michael R. AUSLIN: Negotiating with Imperialism. The 
Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press 2004: 146–75 [another edn, ibid. 2006]. Hugh CORTAZZI: The Revision 
of Japan’s Early Commercial Treaties, London: London School of Economics and Polit-
ical Science, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Dis-
ciplines 1999 (International Studies. Discussion Paper IS/99/377). HORA Tomio 洞富雄: 
Bakumatsu ishinki no gaiatsu to teikō 幕末維新期の外圧と抵抗 (Foreign Pressure and 
Resistance at the End of the Tokugawa Period and during the Meiji Restoration), Azeku-
ra Shobō 校倉書房 1977. ISHII Kanji 石井寛治 and SEKIGUCHI Yoshiyuki 関口尚志 
(eds): Sekai shijō to bakumatsu kaikō 世界市場と幕末開港 (The World Market and 
the Opening of Ports at the End of the Tokugawa Period), Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppan Kai 
東京大学出版会 1982. Harald KLEINSCHMIDT: Legitimität, Frieden, Völkerrecht, Ber-
lin: Duncker & Humblot 2010 (Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft, 159): 277–80. 
Marlene June MAYO: “A Catechism of Diplomacy. The Japanese and Hamilton Fish. 
1872”, Journal of Asian Studies 26 (1967): 397–402, at 389–90. Alistair SWALE: “Amer-
ica. 15 January–6 August 1872”, Ian Hill NISH (ed.): The Iwakura Mission in America 
and Europe. A New Assessment, Richmond, SY: Japan Library 1998 (Meiji Japan Series, 
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colonialism by resorting to the East Asian equivalent of the natural law tra-
dition and thereby provided a record that natural law theory was there used 
as an instrument legitimizing resistance against perceived unjust rules. 
Within this variant of natural law theory, Japan had always been and was 
continuing to be an autonomous, sovereign state like all others. The Meiji 
government thus, in 1868, committed itself to the universalistic and inclu-
sionistic view that it neither could nor would seek to enter some “interna-
tional legal community” of somehow privileged states. 
From the 1870s, however, the Meiji government changed its internation-
alist stance, articulated bids for admission into the “international legal com-
munity” and pursued a policy of the expansion of its rule into East Asia. 
Subsequent governments further expanded their range of activities to the 
South Pacific at the time of World War I and into Southeast Asia during 
World War II.25 At the latest from the turn of the twentieth century, the 
expansion of Japanese government control beyond the Archipelago came to 
be consociated with the reception in Japan of the European concept of colo-
nialism as underlying the practice of colonial rule. Thus, the transformation 
of Japanese foreign policy goals from the universalistic recourse to some 
form of natural law tradition into the strategy of the creation of a colonial 
block under Japanese control warrants the question how the perception of 
colonialism by the Meiji and subsequent governments changed from a criti-
cal into an affirmative stance towards European international law. In a 
broader social context, the question raises the problem of assessing the sig-
nificance of perceptions in international relations. The problem is not a new 
one in the theory of international relations.26 But it has so far not been ap-
plied in combination with interactionism as an approach specifying trans-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
6): 19–21. TANAKA Akira [田中彰]: “Introduction”, KUME Kunitake [久米邦武], The 
Iwakura Embassy 1871–73, vol. 1, Matsudo松戸市: Japan Documents 2002: XV–XXV, 
at XVI. 
25  Harald KLEINSCHMIDT: “Ein Imperium der Defensive. Japanische Großmachtpolitik 
1872–1945”, Michael GEHLER, Robert ROLLINGER, Sabine FICK and Simone PITTL (eds): 
Imperien und Reiche in der Weltgeschichte. Epochenübergreifende und globalhistorische 
Vergleiche, vol. 2, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2014: 1309–80. 
26  Robert JERVIS: Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 1976. Nazli CHOUCRI and Robert Carver NORTH: Nations in 
Conflict. National Growth and International Violence, San Francisco: Freeman 1975. For 
a critical review of these studies see Harald KLEINSCHMIDT: “Historical Method and the 
History of International Relations”, Martin KINTZINGER, Wolfgang STÜRNER and Johan-
nes ZAHLTEN (eds): Das Andere wahrnehmen. August Nitschke zum 65. Geburtstag, 
Cologne, Weimar and Vienna: Böhlau 1991: 653–70. 
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formations of concepts under the condition of their transfer across cultures. 
As Alexander Wendt has appropriately noted,27 the transfer of concepts and 
socially constructed perceptions can break down the cultural and geograph-
ical boundaries separating societies with their states from the international 
arena, because concepts and perceptions as intra-cultural constructs remain 
culturally specific, even when they become transferred across international 
borders of states and into other cultures. They become subject to and may 
themselves kick off interactions, thereby taking on new and casting off old 
elements when becoming applied in societal and cultural contexts different 
from those of their origin.28 Beyond these lines,29 reciprocal interactionism 
																																								 																				
27 Alexander WENDT: Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1999: 113–34 (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 67) 
[twelfth imprint 2009]. 
28 Doris BACHMANN-MEDICK: “The Trans/National Study of Culture. A Translational 
Perspective”, BACHMANN-MEDICK: The Trans/National Study of Culture, Berlin: de 
Gruyter 2014 (Concepts for the Study of Culture, 4): 1–22. Angelika EPPLE: “Globale 
Mikrogeschichte. Auf dem Weg zu einer Geschichte der Relationen”, Ewald HIEBL and 
Ernst LANGTHALER (eds): Im Kleinen das Große suchen. Mikrogeschichte in Theorie und 
Praxis, Innsbruck, Vienna and Bozen: Studienverlag 2012 (Jahrbuch für Geschichte des 
Ländlichen Raumes, 9): 37–47, at 38, 41–2. Kenneth POMERANZ: The Great Divergence. 
China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press 2000: 8–9 [does not take perceptions into consideration]. 
29 The reciprocal interactionist study of perceptions appears to stand in direct opposition 
against established methodological convictions in academic historical research, which 
has continued to follow the long-beaten tracks of uncovering unidirectional impacts and 
to be submerged in objectivist empiricism, thereby ignoring perceptions as a field of in-
vestigation, not merely but decidedly also in German-speaking areas. Thus, as late as in 
2006, Nathalie Zemon DAVIS: “What is Universal about History?”, in: Gunilla-Friederike 
BUDDE, Sebastian CONRAD and Oliver JANZ (eds): Transnationale Geschichte. Themen, 
Tendenzen und Theorien [Festschrift Jürgen Kocka], Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ru-
precht 2006: 15–20 [first delivered in the opening session of the 20th Congress of the In-
ternational Commission of Historical Sciences, Sydney, 3 July 2005], at 16, mat-
ter-of-factly held it to be true that “it is essential to describe and interpret relations 
between peoples along two universal axes: the axis of exchange, involving com-
munication, trade, gifts and alliance, and the axis of power, involving the domination of 
peoples and resistance to domination. To be sure, there can be coercive aspects to 
exchange, and conquest is a form of communication; both elements are present in most 
transactions, but they must still be sorted out.” She thereby excluded perceptions from 
the agenda of historical research. Likewise André Gunder FRANK: ReOrienting the 19th 
Century. Global Economy in the Continuing Asian Age, edited by Robert A. DENEMARK, 
Boulder: Paradigm Publications 2014: 100–02, 181–82, 283–84. Andrea KOMLOSY: 
“André Gunder Frank und die Reorientierung der Weltgeschichte”, Zeitschrift für Welt-
geschichte, vol. 17, nr 2 (2016), pp. 47–69, at p. 55 [first published as “Vorwort” to, 
André Gunder FRANK: ReOrient. Globalwirtschaft im Asiatischen Zeitalter, Vienna: 
Promedia 2016]. And in 1996, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, then portraying 
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as an approach traces cross-cultural impacts of concepts and perceptions 
along a dual carriageway from societal as well as cultural contexts in one 
part of the world to such contexts in other parts of the world, looks at the 
modifications these concepts and perceptions undergo during and after their 
transfers, then scrutinises the return impact of these concepts and percep-
tions with their modifications and thus solicits the questions of who argued 
and shared which specific concepts and perceptions of which origin and 
about which issue when, where and why.30 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
themselves as avantgarde in innovative methodologies, categorically excluded percep-
tions from the research agenda of academic history: “Es geht Historikern und Historike-
rinnen immer [!] um die Erfassung des Wandels der Wirklichkeit in der Zeit.”, HAUPT 
and KOCKA: “Historischer Vergleich”, HAUPT and KOCKA (eds): Geschichte und Ver-
gleich, Frankfurt and New York: Campus 1996: 9–45, at 22. The explicit inclusion of 
women historians in this sentence seems particularly awkward in the light of the strong 
attention feminist historians have paid to the reciprocal interactionist study of perceptions 
from the 1970s. For an early example see Ruth HUBBARD (ed.): Women Looking at Biol-
ogy Looking at Women. A Collection of Feminist Critiques, Boston: Hall 1979. Similarly 
to Haupt and Kocka still Eckart CONZE: “Jenseits von Männern und Mächten. Geschichte 
der internationalen Politik als Systemgeschichte”, Hans C. KRAUS and Nicklas THOMAS 
(eds): Geschichte der Politik, Munich: Oldenbourg 2007 (Historische Zeitschrift. Bei-
hefte, N. F., vol. 44): 41–64, at 41–43. 
30 For the methodology of “entangled” and “connected histories” as well as “histoire croi-
sée”, all leaving return impacts out of their scope of research, see Charles BRIGHT and 
Michael GEYER: “Globalgeschichte und die Einheit der Welt im 20. Jahrhundert”, Com-
parativ, vol. 4, nr 5 (1994): 13–45 [reprinted, Sebastian CONRAD, Andreas ECKERT and 
Ulrike FREITAG (eds): Globalgeschichte, Frankfurt and New York: Campus 2007 (Glob-
algeschichte, 1): 53–79]. Sebastian CONRAD and Andreas ECKERT: “Globalgeschichte, 
Globalisierung, multiple Modernen. Zur Geschichtsschreibung der modernen Welt”, 
CONRAD (as above): 7–51. Michel ESPAGNE: “Comparison and Transfer”, Matthias 
MIDDELL and Lluís ROURA I AULINAS (eds): Transnational Challenges to National Histo-
ry Writing, Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan 2013: 36–53. Michael GEYER and Charles 
BRIGHT: “World History in a Global Age”, American Historical Review 100 (1995): 
1034–60. Bruce MAZLISH and Ralph BUULTJENS (eds): Conceptualizing Global History, 
Boulder: Westview Press 1993. Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL: “Transkulturell vergleichende 
Geschichtswissenschaft”, in: Heinz-Gerhard HAUPT and Jürgen KOCKA, eds: Geschichte 
und Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschrei-
bung, Frankfurt and New York: Campus 1996: 271–313 [reprinted, OSTERHAMMEL: Ge-
schichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 
2001: 11–45]. OSTERHAMMEL: “Transferanalyse und Vergleich im Fernverhältnis”, 
Hartmut KAELBLE and Jürgen SCHRIEWER (eds): Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik 
in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften, Frankfurt and New York: Campus 
2003: 439–67. Kiran Klaus PATEL: “Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte”, 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 52 (2004): 626–45 [reprinted, Jürgen OSTERHAM-
MEL (ed.): Weltgeschichte, Stuttgart: Steiner 2008: 67–89]. Johannes PAULMANN: “Inter-
nationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer”, Historische Zeitschrift 267 (1998): 
649–85. Shalini RANDERIA: “Geteilte Geschichte und verwobene Moderne”, Jörn RÜSEN, 
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 Reciprocal interactionism thus takes a step beyond the conventional ap-
proaches that are aimed at detecting some nebulous “cognitive prior”, i.e., a 
politically unspecified, allegedly cultural preparedness for reception. It de-
mands analytical attention to be paid to the political conditions and impacts 
that concepts and perceptions can trigger and to which they become exposed 
when they are applied across cultural boundaries and, furthermore, the im-
pacts concepts and perceptions can have when they are returned to the group 
or culture of their origin. In other words, reciprocal interactionism as an 
approach to international relations is tied to a methodology that focuses on 
transformations resulting from the cross-cultural use of concepts and percep-
tions and covers these concepts and perceptions themselves together with the 
societal and cultural contexts in which they come to be employed.31 The 
methodology also seeks to determine the political factors that boost or im-
pede the transfer of concepts and perceptions, as, contrary to Mieke Bal’s 
assumption,32 concepts and perceptions do not “travel” by themselves as 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Hanna LEITGEB and Norbert JEGELKA (eds): Zukunftsentwürfe. Ideen für eine Kultur der 
Veränderung, Frankfurt and New York: Campus 1999: 87–96. Sanjay SUBRAHMANYAM: 
“Connected Histories. Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia”, Mod-
ern Asian Studies 31 (1997): 735–62. WEITZ: “System” (note 20). Michael WERNER and 
Bénédictine ZIMMERMANN: “Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire 
Croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen”, Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 
(2002): 607–36. WERNER and ZIMMERMANN: “Penser l’histoire croisée. Entre empirie et 
réflexivité”, WERNER and ZIMMERMANN (eds): De la comparaison à l’histoire croisée, 
Paris: Seuil 2004 (Le genre humain, 42): 15–49. WERNER and ZIMMERMANN: “Histoire 
Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity”, History and Theory 45 (2008): 30–50. 
31 On the concept of “cognitive prior” see Amitav ACHARYA: “Perspectives on Norm Dif-
fusion”, ACHARYA: Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism, It-
haca, London and Singapore: Cornell University Press 2009: 9–30. On processes of of 
the transfer of norms see Martha FINNEMORE and Kathryn SIKKINK: “International Norm 
Dynamics and Political Change”, Peter J. KATZENSTEIN, Robert Owen KEOHANE and 
Stephen D. KRASNER (eds): Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1999: 247–77 [first published, International Organization 
52 (1998): 887–917]. On the older theory of literary reception see Hans Robert JAUß: Li-
teraturgeschichte als Provokation, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1970: 186. Hannelore LINK: 
Rezeptionsforschung, Stuttgart: Metzler 1976: 125. 
32 Edward SAID: “Travelling Theory”, SAID: The World, the Text and the Critic, Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1983: 226–47, who, at 226–27, postulated a se-
quence of four “stages common to the way any theory or idea travels”, first a “point of 
origin” (= “initial circumstances”), second, the “distance traversed” (= the “passage 
through the pressure of various contexts”), third, “a set of conditions” (= “of acceptance 
and ... resistances”), fourth, the “full (or partly) accommodated (or incorporated) idea is 
to some extent transformed by its new uses.” Mieke [Maria Gertrudis] BAL: Travelling 
Concepts in the Humanities. A Rough Guide, Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2002: 
22–55. Doris BACHMANN-MEDICK: “From Hybridity to Translation. Reflections on 
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seemingly autonomous agents but through human agents and their purpose-
ful actions. By consequence, the transfer of concepts and perceptions can 
hardly be isolated from the politics setting the goals for these actions. The 
reciprocal interactionist approach to international relations thus takes into 
consideration the political processes that shape the reception, and the trans-
formation through the reception, of concepts and perceptions and the societal 
as well as cultural contexts out of which and into which the transfers occur. 
As these transfers usually take place in international relations in the long 
term, their study is part of the agenda of global historiography.33 The use by 
the Meiji government of concepts of European provenance, the response by 
it towards European perceptions of Japan and the impact of that response on 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Travelling Concepts”, BACHMANN-MEDICK: Trans/National (note 28): 119–36. Note the 
complete absence of any attention paid in these statements to “ideas” that return to the 
group or culture of their origin. On the quest for interactionism as sketched above see 
Dipesh CHAKRABARTY: “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History”, CHAKRABARTY: 
Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 2000: 27–46 [first published, Representations 37 (1992)]. 
33 However, global historiography has, so far, not included reciprocal interactionism into its 
agenda. For examples of the lack of reference to reciprocal interactionism and to con-
cepts see Jeremy Martin BLACK: Introduction to Global Military History. 1775 to the 
Present Day, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge 2005. Sebastian CONRAD and Andreas EK-
KERT: “Globalgeschichte, Globalisierung, multiple Modernen. Zur Geschichtsschreibung 
der modernen Welt”, CONRAD, ECKERT and Ulrike FREITAG (eds): Globalgeschichte. 
Thesen, Ansätze, Themen, Frankfurt: Campus 2007 (Globalgeschichte, 1): 7–51. CON-
RAD: Globalgeschichte, Munich: Beck 2013. Michael GEYER: Entwicklungen in der Ge-
schichtswissenschaft, Part 2: Universal, Welt- und Globalgeschichte, Vienna: Verein für 
Geschichte und Sozialkunde 1998 (Beiträge zur Historischen Sozialkunde, 32). Peter 
GRAN: Beyond Eurocentrism. A New View of Modern World History, Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press 1996. Theodor Herman von LAUE: “World History, Cultural Relativism 
and the Global Future”, Philip POMPER, Richard H. ELPHICK and Richard T. VANN (eds): 
World History, Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell 1998: 217–33. Matthias MIDDELL: 
“World Orders in World Histories before and after World War I”, Sebastian CONRAD and 
Dominic SACHSENMAIER (eds): Competing Visions of World Order, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave and New York: St Martin’s Press 2007: 97–119. MIDDELL and Katja 
NAUMANN: “Global History and the Spatial Turn. From Impacts of Area Studies to the 
Study of Critical Junctures of Globalization”, Journal of Global History 5 (2010): 
149–70. Jürgen OSTERHAMMEL: “Welten des Kolonialismus im Zeitalter der Aufklä-
rung”, Hans-Jürgen LÜSEBRINK (ed.): Das Europa der Aufklärung und die aussereuro-
päische Welt, Göttingen: Wallstein 2006: 19–36. OSTERHAMMEL: “Globalgeschichte”, 
Hans-Jürgen GOERTZ (ed.): Geschichte. Ein Grundkurs, third edn, Reinbek: Rowohlt 
2007: 592–610 [first published, ibid. 1998]. Dietmar ROTHERMUND: “Globalgeschichte 
als Interaktionsgeschichte. Von der Außereuropäischen Geschichte zur Globalgeschich-
te”, ROTHERMUND, Aneignung und Selbstbehauptung. Antworten auf die europäische 
Expansion, Munich: Oldenbourg 1999: 194–216, who covered interaction but excluded 
concepts. 
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political decision-making in Europe shall thus be scrutinized in what follows 
as a case study of the political impact of the transfer of concepts and percep-
tions across cultures. Specifically, the transfer of the concept of colonialism 
across cultural boundaries shall be discussed in conjunction with the impacts 
this transfer had on the changing shape of perceptions of colonial rule in 
Europe and Japan. 
Conceptualizing Colonial Rule 
Katō Hiroyuki and His Response to European Regime Colonialism 
Beyond the various facets of settler (“old”) colonialism, targeted at the 
Americas, the South Pacific and Northeast Asia, and of the colonialism 
(“new”) of direct as well as indirect rule, regime colonialism is a summary 
term for all cultural, economic, legal and political instruments used by Eu-
ropean and the US governments mainly in their relations with governments 
in East Asia, to the end of advancing their political clout in and cultural as 
well as economic impact. Resort to strategies of regime colonialism was 
meant to avoid using military force beyond measures of small scale and the 
establishment of some form of rule. Regime colonialism thus combined 
strategies alternative to wholesale occupation or conquest leaving incumbent 
governments in office in and control over states that remained recognized 
sovereigns with full capability of conducting international relations.34 Yet, 
																																								 																				
34 KLEINSCHMIDT: Legitimität (note 24): 16. In postulating that there should have been 
some “global imperialism” already between 1760 and 1830, Christopher A. BAYLY: “The 
First Age of Global Imperialism”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21 
(1997): 26–47, conceptually equates imperialism with colonialism, overlooks the emer-
gence of regime colonialism in the early part of the nineteenth century and thereby miss-
es core differences between late eighteenth- and late nineteenth-century European per-
ceptions of colonialism. He also fails to take into account the lack of European govern-
ment impact on most parts of Africa and Asia beyond Portuguese strongholds, British 
colonial settlements in the South Pacific from the later eighteenth century and Russian 
controlled settlement in Northeast Asia prior to the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
For the unabashed continuity of policies of settler colonialism in the South Pacific well 
into the nineteenth century see Edward Gibbon WAKEFIELD: The British Colonization of 
New Zealand. Being an Account of the Principles, Objects and Plans of the New Zealand 
Association, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1837. WAKEFIELD: “Letter XIV”, 
WAKEFIELD: A View on the Art of Colonization, London: Parker 1849 [reissue, edited by 
James Collier, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1914: 79–85, at 82–3: “The normal state of high 
profits and wages, notwithstanding the utmost importation of capital and people, in colo-
nies, where the proper fruits of enterprize and industry are secured by good government, 
arises partly from the manner, in which the produce of colonial industry is distributed; 
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regime colonialism was a variant of colonialism in the respect that it denied 
the acceptance of the principle of the equality of sovereign states beyond 
formalities of the making of treaties under international law,35 barred these 
states off from unconditioned access to the “international legal community” 
and imposed the demand that treaty partners of European governments 
should meet certain standards of “civilization” in order to become “admit-
ted” to that “community”.36 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
partly from the great productiveness of industry in a country, where only the most fertile 
spots need to be cultivated. In colonies, as compared with old countries, the landlord and 
the tax-gatherer get but a small share of the produce of industry: the producer, therefore, 
whether capitalist or labourer, gets a large share; indeed, they get nearly the whole, and 
this whole, as before observed, is very large in consequence of the great natural fertility 
of all the cultivated land, or the small cost of production. Both the labourer and the capi-
talist, therefore, get more than they consume. The labourer saves, and the capitalist saves; 
capital augments rapidly. But as nearly all the colonists are either capitalists or labourers, 
who have more than they can consume, the whole colony has more than it can consume. 
Colonies, therefore, are, may I say, naturally exporting communities; they have a large 
produce for exportation. Not only have they a large produce for exportation, but that 
produce is peculiarly suited for exchange with old countries. In consequence of the 
cheapness of land in colonies, the great majority of the people are owners or occupiers of 
land in colonies, and their industry is necessarily in a great measure confined to the pro-
ducing of what comes immediately from the soil, viz. food, and the raw materials of ma-
nufactures. In old countries, on the other hand, where the soil is fully occupied and la-
bour abundant, it may be said that manufactured goods are their natural production for 
export. These are what the colonists do not produce. The colony produces what the old 
country wants; the old country produces what the colony wants. The old country and the 
colony, therefore, are, naturally each other’s best customers.”; reprints of the original edn, 
New York: Kelley 1969; Kitchener, Ont.: Batoche 2001]. Similarly Paul LEROY-BEAU-
LIEU: De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes, Paris: Guillaumin 1874 [second edn, 
ibid. 1882: 542–47, 615–16; third edn, ibid. 1886); fourth edn, ibid. 1891; fifth edn, ibid. 
1902; sixth edn, Paris: Alcan 1908]. For studies see above, note 19. 
35 WHEATON: Elements, § 252 (note 5, edn by Boyd, 1889): 356. 
36 Georg JELLINEK: “China und das Völkerrecht”, JELLINEK: Ausgewählte Schriften, vol. 2, 
Berlin: Häring 1911: 487–95 [reprint, Aalen: Scientia 1970; first published, Deutsche 
Juristen-Zeitung (1900): 401–04]. For studies see Ian CHONG: External Intervention and 
the Politics of State Formation. China, Indonesia and Thailand. 1893–1952, Cambridge: 
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Initially, the Meiji government, in accordance with its declaration of Feb-
ruary 1868, responded to these forms of regime colonialism by beginning to 
attempt the revision of the existing treaties on the occasion of the German 
request to renegotiate the Japanese-Prussian treaty of 1861.37 The German 
side deemed the renegotiation necessary as Prussia had been merged into the 
North German Confederation in 1866 and requested that the existing treaty 
should be changed to include the new state name on the German side.38 The 
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Meiji government accepted the request and succeeded in changing a few 
stipulations to the effect that the new treaty featured a larger number of reci-
procal concessions than the previous agreement of 1861.39 However, the 
conclusion of the treaty between Japan and the North German Confederation, 
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signed in 1869, proved to be a singular occasion which did not re-occur up 
until the mid 1890s. Instead, the Meiji government came under pressure to 
enter, in the very same year 1869, into another unequal treaty, this time with 
Austria-Hungary that the British emissary in Japan Harry Parkes had negoti-
ated along the conventional lines.40 Moreover, the process of revising the 
existing treaties was protracted due to European and US government reluc-
tance to grant legal equality to Japan. The European and the US sides argued 
that Japan had not reached the demanded standard of “civilization”. The 
revision process advanced only from the middle of the 1890s41 and was 
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concluded during the first decade of the twentieth century, when all of the 
unequal treaties were finally abolished.42 
In response to the pressures laid upon it to “advance” “civilization”, the 
Meiji government enforced a variety of measures relating to domestic policy 
and aimed at demonstrating its capability to apply European and North 
American cultural, economic, legal and political norms and practices. I shall 
not revisit the process of the enforcement of these norms and practices here. 
Instead, I shall analyze the much neglected formation of the strategy of ex-
pansion of Japanese government control beyond the archipelago. I shall re-
view this process against the backdrop of European and US-imposed “civi-
lizing” missions. And I shall scrutinize the ideology argued by Katō Hi-
royuki加藤弘之, a long-time legal advisor to the Meiji government on issues 
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of constitutional law43 and state governance and eventually Rector of Tokyo 
Imperial University.44 
At the latest by the middle of the 1870s, when initial attempts to accom-
plish the desired quick treaty revision were becoming obstructed,45 the Mei-
ji government realized that some European and the US governments used the 
treaties as instruments of their own great-power politics and that great-power 
politics was then inseparable from the pursuit of the expansion of colonial 
rule. The recognition that the treaties had more far-reaching implications 
than merely generating unequal privileges beneficial for only one treaty par-
ty, was water on the mills for advocates of the argument that treaty revision 
could only be accomplished through the build-up of military strength and 
economic affluence rather than through trust in the bindingness of legal 
commitments, the peacefulness of international trade and the quiet pursuit of 
cultural, economic, legal and political reforms within the state.46 To accom-
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plish the goal of increasing the war-making potential, a group of reformers 
agreed in 1873 that fundamental changes ought to be undertaken in order to 
render Japanese culture, politics and society compatible with what appeared 
to be the standard of European “civilization”.47 Katō was a member of this 
group and joined in the demand that patterns of Western culture should im-
mediately be transferred into Japan to strengthen the state and advance Japan 
to great-power status.48 
The domestic reforms seen as required to accomplish these goals were 
thus accompanied by strategies for the expansion of Japanese government 
control beyond the archipelago in an effort to demonstrate military strength 
through victory in wars. The wars were to be targeted at states in the vicinity 
of Japan. Katō became an enthusiast in support not only of providing for 
some ‘organic’ unity between the ruler and the ruled,49 but also of expan-
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tingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1975. 
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sionist strategies. In 1893, Katō took the bold step of writing and publishing 
in German a monograph in which he argued that there was a global ‘struggle 
for the right of the stronger’.50 The monograph appeared first in Tokyo and 
in the following year 1894 also in Berlin. It is not clear why Katō wrote the 
text in German, as he could hardly have expected to be able to attract a wide 
readership in Germany with Social Darwinist arguments that were all too 
familiar for a German audience.51 Rather, it seems that he wanted to im-
press on his contemporaries in Japan the fact that he was sufficiently familiar 
with German and Germany to be able to write what he gave out as an aca-
demic treatment of his topic. Katō, who had since 1873 favored the use of 
German models for the reforms in Japan, seems thus to have wanted to ex-
pose an audience in Japan to the ideological connections between domestic 
political reform measures and expansionist foreign-policy strategies. 
For his book, Katō mainly used legal and social theory published in the 
German language, namely by Rudolf von Jhering,52 Ludwig Gumplowicz,53 
Johann Caspar Bluntschli54 and Albert Schäffle,55 while also referring to 
German versions of works by sociologist Herbert Spencer56 und anthropol-
ogist Edward Tylor.57 He organized his argument into twelve chapters, ten 
of which dealt with the domestic conditions of what he described as the ‘or-
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57 Edward Burnett TYLOR: Die Anfänge der Cultur, Leipzig: Winter 1873 [first published s. 
t.: Primitive Culture, London: Murray 1871]. 
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ganic’ unity between the ruler and the ruled, and devoted only the last mate-
rial chapter before the concluding summary to aspects of foreign policy. In 
this chapter, Katō traced across the ages the ‘evolution’ of what he took to 
be ‘the right of the stronger’. Without explicit reference to Thomas Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, Katō assumed that the states of the world were, with regard to the 
relations among themselves, in the state of nature, asked, under which con-
dition international law could have arisen in Europe and classed international 
law as the instrument allowing the progress out of the state of nature. Based 
on his starting point that international law was of European origin and had 
secondarily become globalized, Katō replied to his question with reference 
to Gumplowicz. In Katō’s reading, Gumplowicz had argued that states in 
Europe had not become subjected to the rules of international law solely in 
consequence of the effects of some altruistic motives. Instead, he believed, 
the subjection of states to international law had, like all other results of per-
ceived progress, been the consequence of the exercise of the ‘right of the 
stronger’. This result, Katō thought, could only have been achieved because 
a system of states with equal strength had evolved, with the consequence 
that no government of any single state could have conceived plans for the 
conquest of another state. Therefore, Katō concluded, the governments of 
these states had through their own self-interest pursued policies of peacefully 
regulating intercourse among themselves.58 International law, Katō opined, 
was unsuitable as a means of regulating the conduct of war, but nevertheless 
resulted from the egotism of states whose governments had agreed to pursue 
their self-interest peacefully.59 In short, Katō’s notion of the ‘right of the 
stronger’ lent expression to the view that states should be entitled to pursue 
their legitimate self-interest and that such pursuit was reconcilable with the 
quest for the preservation of peace. 
Katō then took the argument a step further and differentiated between 
states that he wished to categorize as ‘strong’ and those that appeared to be 
‘weak’ in his view. He ascribed “civilization” to the ‘strong’ states and their 
populations, while classing the ‘weak’ states and their populations as ‘unciv-
ilized’. He measured ‘strength’ and ‘weakness’ as well as “civilization” and 
lack of “civilization” of states and population groups in terms of political 
clout and military capability, thereby linking himself to the contemporary 
																																								 																				
58 KATŌ: Kampf (note 50): 177. Referring to Oswald KÖHLER: Der Egoismus und die Civi-
lisation, Stuttgart: Dietz 1883: 43. Similar arguments are in Georg JELLINEK: System der 
subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte, Freiburg: Mohr 1892: 298, 300. 
59 KATŌ: Kampf (note 50): 179–80. 
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jargon of European and North American diplomats, military organizers and 
theorists of international law.60 In Katō’s world view, governments of 
‘strong’ states would use diplomatic pressure and military force to coerce 
‘weak’ states and impose upon them the ‘right of the stronger’. Katō argued 
that these patterns of the conduct of international relations were in line with 
international law, which he ranked as the instrument regulating the relations 
between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states as long as the ‘state of nature’ prevailed 
among states in the international arena. According to Katō, the ‘state of na-
ture’ allowed states, seemingly like all other natural organisms, not only the 
use of measures of self-preservation but also of opportunities to grow. If the 
use of these measures and opportunities was disadvantageous for ‘weak’ 
states, this was neither an unlawful nor an immoral consequence of the im-
position of the ‘right of the stronger’ but merely an inevitable effect of con-
ditions in the state of nature. In this way, Katō noted, European states had 
accomplished the growth of their ‘strength’ at the expense of ‘weak’ states 
and had occupied as much land as they had been able to grab. The history of 
“civilization” was, to Katō, a struggle for survival to the disadvantage of the 
‘weak’ and ‘uncivilized’ states and their populations.61 Katō, like some of 
his contemporaries,62 thus underwrote the creeds enshrined in his Social 
Darwinist reference literature. 
Katō predicted that, as a consequence of the expansion of European states, 
the ‘uncivilized’ states would be ‘devoured’, and added his conviction that 
this outcome would be of service to humankind. This, he argued, was to be 
the case because, through the growth in intensity of ‘world intercourse’ 
(Weltverkehr), some kind of societal mechanism would arise among ‘strong’ 
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Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press 1996: 21–6 [first published, London: HMSO 
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(Colonial Policy), Nitobe Inazō zenshū 新渡戸稲造全集 (Collected Works), vol. 4, 
edited by YANAIHARA Tadao 矢内原忠雄 , Kyōbun Kan 教文館  1969: 5–389, at 
165–67, like Katō, defined colonialism as the power of the nation. 
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states, this mechanism would establish international organizations and then 
govern international relations through legal and moral norms.63 Katō also 
disclosed his awareness that these processes of the making and aggrandize-
ment of ‘strong’ states would impose a heavy burden and much suffering 
upon ‘weak’ states, while portraying these processes as going on with brutal 
inevitability.64 The expansion of European states was, in Katō’s view, in-
compatible with the morality of Christianity and, in his judgment, more evil 
than the behavior of predators.65 Explicitly, he ranked the European expan-
sionist states as the cruelest and most dangerous predators the world had 
ever experienced, as their governments appeared not to have any sense of the 
damages they were inflicting upon population groups in the ‘weak’ states 
under their sway. Katō thus did nothing to justify colonial rule but neverthe-
less insisted that expansion was neither unlawful nor immoral but simply 
‘natural’. As the European states were expanding at the expense of ‘weak’ 
states, while establishing international organizations to regulate their inter-
course, they appeared to Katō to be on their way out of the ‘state of nature’ 
and to develop that very unifying societal mechanism out of which a world 
state would emerge in the future.66 
Katō did not envision the future world state as comprising the entire globe 
but wished to include into it only ‘strong’ states. In this respect, his vision of 
the world state was in line with that argued by contemporary European and 
North American theorists of international law who were portraying the “in-
ternational legal community as a club shaped by restrictive access rules. 
Katō included into the “international legal community” the European great 
powers, China and Japan and ascribed to with members of the “community” 
the features of “civilization” and ‘masculinity’. The allegedly “civilized”, 
‘masculine’ and thereby ‘strong’ states, so Katō analyzed, were taking pos-
session of the world and then dividing it among themselves in the form of 
colonial dependencies. In the future world state, morality and law would 
grow stronger, but the world state would not arise from some common desire 
for peace among the ‘strong’ states but from their rigorous pursuit of 
																																								 																				
63 Katō anticipated the arguments of the international peace movement of the early 
twentieth century. See Walther Max Adrian SCHÜCKING: “Die Organisation der Welt”, 
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64 KATŌ: Kampf (note 50): 181–86. 
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self-interest. Rule by the ‘strong’ states over the colonial dependencies, into 
which the ‘weak’ states were to be assembled, was not to be regulated in 
terms of international law, Katō observed in accordance with contemporary 
international legal theorists,67 but was to be controlled under state law. He 
admitted that he was unclear about the path by which the future world state 
would emerge, but committed himself to the optimistic assessment that gov-
ernments of the involved “civilized” states would be wise enough to set it 
up. 
Katō’s program of colonial rule of 1893 breathed the European biologistic 
creeds of the second half of the nineteenth century that modeled the state on 
the living body, likened the state to an organism and classed it as a qua-
si-personal actor.68 It also reflected the mindset of propagandists of colonial 
expansion such as Frederick Lugard69 and Carl Peters.70 Like them, Katō 
posited colonial rule as something ‘natural’ whereby, like these propagan-
dists, he used ‘nature’ as a paradigm for justifying the claimed inevitability 
of colonial rule, and placed this justificatory paradigm above the law and 
morality. The world state he postulated for the future was, in his mind, an 
assembly of states placed under international law but would not be in charge 
of regulating colonial affairs. Yet international law, in Katō’s making, could 
only fulfill the task of subjecting states to its rule, when and as long as the 
world state existed as the “international legal community” with its restrictive 
access rules. Katō’s world state would thus be hierarchically structured with 
the ‘strong’, ‘masculine’ and ‘civilized’ states leading it and the ‘weak’, 
‘feminine’ and ‘uncivilized’ states being equivalent to some form of prole-
tariat seemingly doomed to face eventual destruction. As Katō rendered 
colonial rule ‘natural’, it could, in his mind, be unlawful and immoral as 
long as it was contributing to the alleged perfectioning of humankind 
through the expansion of ‘strong’ states. As Katō ranked Japan among the 
‘strong’ states, he postulated for Japan some right to have colonial depend-
encies. 
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Katō’s program of colonial rule articulated two aspects of the foreign pol-
icy of the Mid-Meiji period, first, the effort to accomplish equality with the 
great powers, and second, the consociation of great-power status with colo-
nial rule. Only the revision of the treaties that the government of Japan had 
had to sign between 1854 and 1869 would allow the restoration of Japan to 
its status of full legal equality as a sovereign state. This goal had been reiter-
ated again and again since 1868. Katō thus did not even have to mention it 
explicitly. But through his theory of the ‘right of the stronger’, he fused the 
demand for treaty revision with the quest for great-power status, manifest in 
colonial rule, and thereby added political pressure in access to what was 
already being exercised domestically upon the Meiji government during the 
1890s. For, despite major cultural, economic, legal and political reforms 
having been implemented during the 1870s and 1880s, the old treaties con-
tinued to be in force. 
European legal philosophers took the same position claiming that the al-
legedly ‘savage freedom’ of ‘barbarians’ should ‘become subject to ordered 
rule’ and that such practice was ‘as little illegal as it was in the sphere of 
private law to put under guardianship a wholly or partly insane person’. This 
perspective classed purported ‘savages’ as deviants. Bonn legal philosopher 
Ferdinand Walter concluded that areas, in which so-called ‘nomadic’ ‘sav-
ages’ were living, could be occupied legally. This, he thought, could be so 
because ‘occupation of savage nations, which do not acknowledge a com-
munity of states, is not an infringement of international law’.71 Members of 
the “international legal community” seemed to form a ‘family of culture’,72 
appeared to act on some form of ‘world stage’73 and to determine the fates 
of the allegedly “lower races” wherever in the world,74 purportedly for the 
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sake of preserving peace. Nineteenth-century theorists thus licensed the sub-
jection to the control of American and European states of groups that they 
were not willing to recognise as “civilized”. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, this argument found wide reception even among liberal imperialists 
in Japan. For one, Ukita Kazutami 浮田和民 declared what he termed the 
absorption of barbarous countries or lands of anarchy to be not immoral at 
all and propagated some ‘ethical imperialism’ 論理的帝国主義 (ronriteki 
teikoku shugi) as a means of promoting “civilisation” 文明 (bunmei).75 
The second aspect related to demands for colonial expansion that had 
been articulated in Japan since the 1850s,76 but which the government had 
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then not taken up. In 1893, Katō was setting the standard for how, in his 
view, the government was now obliged to proceed. In essence, he formulated 
the war aims anticipating the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95. The war thus 
has to be placed into a broader context, not merely, as has been suggested, 
under the goal of making manifest Japanese influence in Korea.77 Instead, 
Katō pronounced the use of military force to acquire great-power status on 
the globe at large as the paramount war aim and to do so by way of estab-
lishing the Japanese government as an institution of colonial rule. In Katō’s 
argument, the collective experience of the discrimination Japan had suffered 
from governments in Europe and the USA, did not stand against the Japa-
nese bid for colonial rule but the former conditioned the latter. Katō’s recep-
tion of the European concept of colonialism was neither partial nor the 
product of a misunderstanding, as has been argued,78 but the result of a 
purposeful transfer in pursuit of the bid for great-power status. 
However, the Meiji government did not take over Katō’s program of co-
lonial expansion as a whole, but deviated from it in two major points. The 
first point concerned terminology. Whereas Katō did not shy away from 
using words characteristic of European imperialist great-power ideology, the 
Meiji government carefully avoided the use of imperialist diction in its offi-
cial statements. The second point referred to the concretization of colonial 
administration, as it became implemented79 after the conclusion of the Si-
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no-Japanese War in 1895.80 While Katō was ready to write off the states he 
ranked as ‘weak’ and ‘uncivilized’, the Meiji government raised the ad-
vancement of “civilization” to the main goal of its own program for the im-
plementation of colonial rule with specific concern for Taiwan, which had 
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been placed under Japanese rule in 1895. That the Meiji government took 
these steps against Katō’s theoretical advice, was the result of the reception 
into government policy of thought patterns of Pan-Asianism. 
Pan-Asianism versus Imperialism – Pan-Asianism and Colonialism 
As an ideology of anti-colonial resistance, Pan-Asianism stood against 
strategies towards the expansion of rule beyond Japan. Thus when, for one, 
Pan-Asianist journalist and historian Takekoshi Yosaburō 竹越輿三郎 com-
pleted his analysis of Japan’s expansion policy in spring 1914, he concluded 
with the statement that Japan was not in need of colonies. In other words, 
shortly before the beginning of World War I, which featured the Japanese 
occupation of German colonial dependencies in China and the South Pacific 
north of the Equator, Pan-Asianism was an ideology manifestly positioned in 
opposition against Japanese colonial rule.81 Even Nitobe Inazō, who had 
been involved in the colonial administration of Taiwan during the Meiji 
Period, categorized, in retrospect after World War I, the history of colonial-
ism exclusively as the history of national egotism of the European great 
powers.82 From the point of view of Pan-Asianists, the Japanese govern-
ment was to pursue the declared goal of unifying Asia through the removal 
of European colonial control.83 According to Pan-Asianist demands, Japan 
																																								 																				
81 TAKEKOSHI Yosaburō: “Japan’s Colonial Policy”, MASAOKA Naoichi (ed.): Japan to 
America, New York: Putnam 1915: 95–99, at 97–8 [first published, New York and Lon-
don: Putnam 1914]. MIWA: “Theories” (note 76): 165–66. 
82 NITOBE Inazō: “Japanese Colonization”, Asiatic Review, Fourth Series, vol. 16 (1920): 
113–21, at 120–21 [first published, Proceedings. The Japan Society of London (1919); 
reprinted, NITOBE: The Works, vol. 23, 1972: 111–20. For a study see Ian Hill NISH: 
“Nitobe and the Secretariat in London 1919”, NAGAO Teruhiko 長尾輝彦 (ed.): Nitobe 
Inazō. From Bushido to the League of Nations, Sapporo札幌市: Hokkaidō University. 
Graduate School of Letters 北海道大学文学研究科 2006: 167–84. 
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as a state had the obligation, once its self-liberation from the imposed ine-
quality of relations with great powers in Europe had been accomplished, to 
liberate states specifically in East, Southeast and South Asia by bringing 
“civilization” to them.84 For one, art theorist Okakura Tenshin 岡倉天心 (or 
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Pierre-François SOUYRI, “Critiquer le colonialisme dans le Japon d’avant 1945”, Cipango 
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Kakuzō 覚三), in a way through a performative speech act, proclaimed “Asia 
is one” in 1903, whereby he then subsumed into “Asia” all cultures influ-
enced by Buddhism.85 In addition, however, Pan-Asianism also served as an 
ideological instrument that could be used to advocate the strengthening of 
Japanese political influence specifically upon China and Korea.86 The Meiji 
government followed this advocacy in its justification of the military inter-
vention in China in 189487 and against Russia in 1904. But this line of ar-
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University 2006: 112–21, argues that such advocacy was drawn on racialist perceptions 
borrowed from German physical anthropology through the teaching of Erwin von Baelz, 
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gument had its flaws from the very beginning. Domestic right-wing critics of 
the government’s anti-Russian strategy during the Russo-Japanese War ar-
gued that the campaign, apparently fought to remove colonial control from 
East Asia, had jeopardized the security both of Japan and of East Asia. For, 
even if Russia had withdrawn from Chinese territory, other European gov-
ernments were still there and would now threaten even Japan’s increased 
military strength while the Japanese armed forces were not ready to stand up 
against this treat.88 Moreover, leftist critics such as Kōtoku Shūsui, rejected 
war as a means for the expansion of rule and dissected the strategies of colo-
nial expansion. In 1901, one year before John Atkinson Hobson’s critique of 
imperialism as a manifestation of colonial rule was published,89 Kōtoku 
summed up his own critical analysis of the expansion of colonial rule into 
the statement that ‘imperialism’ 帝国主義 (teikoku shugi) was spreading 
across the world like a prairie fire, thereby voicing opposition against the 
damages inflicted through colonial rule upon populations all over the 
globe.90 Hence, Japanese Socialist critics of colonial rule argued that the 
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Meiji government should not allow itself to be placed into the camp of colo-
nial rulers, and even accused it of taking over all the evils of colonialism 
from which it had just liberated itself. The Meiji and, subsequently, the 
Taishō governments, however, remained unimpressed by that brand of criti-
cism. Instead, they felt encouraged to proceed with the expansionist strategy 
on the basis of the alliance with the United Kingdom.91 The alliance, first 
concluded in 1902, was renewed in 1905 with the explicit recognition by the 
government of the United Kingdom of Japan’s “special political, military 
and economical interests in Corea”.92 Before it declared war on Germany on 
23 August 1914,93 the Taishō government restated its Pan-Asianist convic-
tions, demanded, after some initial hesitation, that Germany vacate its colo-
nial dependencies in China,94 proceeded with the military occupation of this 
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colony once the German government had refused to reply to its ultimatum, 
and then drove the German administration out of its colonial dependencies in 
the South Pacific north of the Equator.95 
After World War I, the Taishō government and military analysed the 
conduct and outcome of World War I carefully, and intellectual designers of 
colonial rule continued to fuse Pan-Asianist ideologies with the now mani-
festly existing but not officially so termed colonial empire now extending 
beyond the confines of what used to be termed East Asia.96 In 1920, the 
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League of Nations extended legitimacy to Japanese rule over islands in the 
South Pacific by granting a “Class C” mandate97 according to Article XXII 
of its Covenant.98 However, what was in fact an empire was still not called 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
[reprint, ibid.: 1897; new edn, ibid.: 1942]. On Watanabe see Mark R. PEATTIE: 
“Nanshin. The ‘Southward Advance’ 1931–1941 as a Prelude to the Japanese Occupa-
tion of Southeast Asia”, Peter DUUS, Ramon Hawley MYERS and Mark R. PEATTIE 
(eds): The Japanese Wartime Empire. 1931–1945, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1996: 189–242, at 198. 
097 Text of the mandate dated 17 December 1920 in PAUWELS: Islands (note 95): 147–49. 
098 For contemporary discussions about the mandate in the German and US presses see 
Tokyo, Gaimu Shō Shiryō Kan 外務省資料館, B 9,6,0,2, and Nihon gaikō bunsho 日
本外交文書 (Diplomatic Records of Japan), Shōwa 8 nen tai Ō Bei kokusai kankei 昭
和 8年対欧米国際関係 (Relations with Europe and America Year Shōwa 8 [1933]), 
Series II, vol. 2, part 2; Gaimu Shō 外務省 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 1997, nr 170 
(dated 25 March 1933): 305–06, nr 173 (dated 4 April 1933): 308. For the discussion on 
the mandates from the point of view of legal studies see Norman BENTWICH: The 
Mandates System, London: Longman 1930. George H. BLAKESLEE: “Japan’s New Island 
Possessions in the Pacific. History and Present Status”, Journal of International 
Relations 12 (1921): 173–91. Umberto BORSI: I mandati internazionali in relazione alla 
classificazione giuridica delle colonie, Rome: USILA 1928 [also, Studi di diritto 
pubblico e corporativo, vol. 1, nr 7 (1925)]. Ramendra Nath CHOWDHURI: International 
Mandates, The Hague: Nijhoff 1955. Georges D. CIORICEANU: Les mandats inter-
nationaux. Une conséquence des principes fondamentaux de la Société des Nations, 
Paris: Édition de “La Vie Universitaire” 1921. Paul Hibbert CLYDE: Japan’s Pacific 
Mandate, New York: Macmillan 1935 [reprint, Port Washington: Kennikat Press 1967]. 
Louis COMISETTI: Mandats et souveraineté, Paris: Recueil Sirey 1934. Giulio DIENA: 
“Les mandats internationaux”, Recueil des cours 5 (1924): 211–66. Luther Harris 
EVANS: “Would Japanese Withdrawal from the League Affect the Status of the Japanese 
Mandate?”, American Journal of International Law 27 (1933): 240–42. P. T. FURUKAKI: 
Les mandats internationaux de la Société des Nations. LLD. Thesis, University of 
Lyons 1923. FURUKAKI: “Nature juridique des mandats internationaux de la Société des 
Nations”, Bibliothèque universelle et revue de Genève (1926): 381–90. Frieda 
GSELL-TRÜMPI: Zur rechtlichen Natur der Völkerbundsmandate. LLD. Thesis, Univer-
sity of Zurich 1928 [published, Glarus: Tschudy 1928 (Glaner Beiträge zur Geschichte, 
Rechtswissenschaft, Sozialpolitik und Wirtschaftskunde, 8)]. Hessel Duncan HALL: 
Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeships, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment 
1948 (Studies in the Administration of International Law and Organization, 9) [reprint, 
New York: Kraus 1972]. Mark Frank LINDLEY: The Acquisition and Sovereignty of 
Backward Territories in International Law, London: Longman 1926: 20–2, 325–77 
[reprint, New York: Negro University Press 1969]. Elizabeth van MAANEN-HELMER: 
The Mandates System in Relation to Africa and the Pacific Islands, London: King 1929: 
13–4, 36, 52–5. Aaron Morris MARGALITH: The International Mandates, Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press 1930. Giuseppe MENOTTI DE FRANCESCO: “La natura 
giuridica dei mandate internazionali”, Studi nelle scienze giuridiche et sociali 10 
(1926): 1–130. Albert MILLOT: Les mandats internationaux, Paris: Larose 1924. Giorgio 
Balladore PALLIERI: I mandati della Società delle nazioni, Turin: Bocca 1928. PAUWELS: 
Islands (note 95): 131–46. Paul PIC: Le régime du mandat d’après le traité de 
Versailles, Paris: Pédone 1923 [also, Revue générale de droit international public 
 Japan Looking at the World Looking at Japan 
Japonica Humboldtiana 20 (2018) 
159 
empire in official Japanese terminology, even though a specific Ministry 拓
務省 (Takumushō) was established in 1929 to administer, among other mat-
ters, the overseas areas. The term “empire” had since the Meiji Period been 
reserved for the state of Japan in official terminology,99 and the Taishō and 
early Shōwa governments continued to display significant reluctance to em-
ploy the terminology of colonialism. Hence, the legacy of Pan-Asianism 
continued to impact on policy-making through the ideology of liberation 
from colonial rule beyond World War I. 
During the 1930s, one of the most vocal proponents of the new type of 
Pan-Asianism emerging was Miki Kiyoshi 三木清, Professor of Philosophy 
at Hōsei University 法政大学 in Tokyo. Miki defended the idea that the 
territories which had come under Japanese government control could not 
form a colonial empire. Instead, he argued that the Shōwa government 
should promote internationalism through its “civilizing” impact specifically 
on East Asia, with the alleged “civilization” becoming the ferment for the 
generation of future independence from the West. Miki further believed that 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894/95 had, in fact through official institutional-
ization, resulted in the formation of some ‘East Asian Cooperation Associa-
tion’ 東亜協力隊 (Tōa Kyōryoku Tai), in which ‘cooperation’ was not to be 
accomplished through governments of states but through cultural exchange 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
(1923)]. Andrea RAPISARDI-MIRABELLI: Questioni generali e particolari inerenti alla 
Società delle nazoni. La natura giuridica dei “Mandati internazionali” della Società 
delle Nazioni, Siena: Circolo Giuridico della Reale Università 1928. Robert REDSLOB: 
Le système des mandats internationaux, Haarlem and The Hague: Willink 1926 [first 
published, Bulletin de l’Institut intermédiaire international 15 (1925): 284–329]. Daniel 
François Willem van REES: Les mandats internationaux, 2 vols, Paris: Rousseau 
1927–28. Wolfgang SCHNEIDER: Das völkerrechtliche Mandat, Stuttgart: Ausland und 
Heimat 1926 (Schriften des Auslands-Instituts. Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche 
Reihe, Bd 2). J. SNELLEN VAN VOLLENHOVEN: “Notes on the Japanese Mandate Islands”, 
Bulletin of the Colonial Institute of Amsterdam 1 (1937): 69–74. Carmine STARACE: I 
mandati internazionali, Isola del Liri: Macioce & Pisani 1921. Jakob STOYANOVSKY: La 
théorie générale des mandats internationaux. LLD. Thesis, University of Paris 1925. 
Alberto VALLINI: I mandati internazionali della Società delle nazioni, Milan: Hoepli 
192. Edward Thomas WILLIAMS: “Japan’s Mandate in the Pacific”, American Journal of 
International Law 27 (1933): 428–39. Junius B. WOOD: “Japan’s Mandate in the 
Pacific”, Asia 21 (1921): 747–53. Quincy WRIGHT: “Sovereignty of the Mandates”, 
American Journal of International Law 17 (1923): 691–703. WRIGHT: Mandates under 
the League of Nations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1930: 122–35, 519 
[reprint, New York: Greenwood Press 1968]. 
099  KLEINSCHMIDT: “Imperium” (note 25): 1312–20. 
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among ‘peoples’ 民族 (minzoku).100 According to Miki, the ‘cooperation’ 
among ‘peoples’ was to transcend simple nationalism while preserving the 
cultural integrity of every ‘people’ in the “Kyōryoku Tai”. Japan, Miki de-
manded, had the obligation to lead the “Kyōryoku Tai”, because, he thought, 
this idea had come up there and because Japan was the most “civilized” state 
in it. Thus, Miki, like Katō, fully embraced the rhetoric of “civilization”, 
while going beyond Katō in turning the promotion of ‘civilization’ into the 
task not just of the government but even of the population of Japan as a 
whole. Miki thus insisted that the Japanese ‘people’ should curtail their own 
nationalist sentiments in fulfillment of the self-appointed task of advancing 
the goals of the unofficial “Kyōryoku Tai” and would have to respect the 
cultural identity of all other ‘peoples’ in this ‘Association’.101 Miki thereby 
granted legitimacy to Japanese rule over territories and populations in East 
Asia and the South Pacific by fusing the hierarchical order within the 
‘kyōryokutai’ with the Pan-Asianist demand to contribute to liberation from 
colonial rule. In this perverted version of Pan-Asianist ideology,102 Japanese 
rule appeared to be legitimate until liberation from colonial rule would have 
made it redundant. But Miki left it to the government of Japan to decide 
when the supposed liberation from colonial rule would have been accom-
plished. 
Already early in the 1930s, journalist and Takushoku University 拓殖大
学 Professor Mitsukawa Kametarō 満川亀太郎103 radicalized Miki’s ver-
																																								 																				
100 Miki Kiyoshi zenshū 三木清全集 (Collected Works), vol. 17, Iwanami Shoten 岩波書
店, 1968: 516–17. On Miki see John Namjun KIM: “The Temporality of Empire. The 
Imperial Cosmopolitanism of Miki Kiyoshi and Tanabe Hajime”, Sven SAALER and 
Julian Victor KOSCHMANN (eds): Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. 
Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, London and New York: Routledge 2007: 
150–67, at 153, 156–57. 
101 Miki Kiyoshi zenshū, vol. 17 (note 100): 516–17. Likewise RŌYAMA Masamichi 蝋山政
道, Tōa to sekai. Shin chitsujo e no ronsaku 東亜と世界 新秩序への論策 (East Asia 
and the World. Plan for the New Order), Kaizō Sha改造社 1941: 91. For studies see 
AYDIN: Politics (note 83): 161–89. William Miles FLETCHER III: Ideologies of Political 
and Economic Reform and Fascism in Prewar Japan. Ryū Shintarō, Rōyama Masamichi 
and the Shōwa Research Association. Ph.D. Thesis, typescript, New Haven: Yale 
University 1975: 137–46, 151–64, esp. at 161–62. FLETCHER: The Search for a New 
Order, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press 1982: 29–39, 110–16. 
102 Correctly TAKEUCHI: Ajia (note 83). 
103 Christopher W. A. SZPILMAN: “Between Pan-Asianism and Nationalism. Mitsukawa 
Kametarō and the Campaign to Reform Japan and Liberate Asia”, Sven SAALER and 
Julian Victor KOSCHMANN (eds): Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History. 
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sion of Pan-Asianism by inserting into it arguments drawn from the German 
ideological concept of Lebensraum. Taking up emigration proposals of the 
1920s,104 Mitsukawa claimed that the Japanese population was rapidly 
growing, its growth would soon lead to overpopulation, and overpopulation 
would in turn lead to demands for the creation of further Lebensraum. He 
described Japan as an assemblage of small rocky islands bereft of natural 
resources and thus seemingly faced with the decision either to expand or to 
perish. Mitsukawa thus demanded the formulation of an aggressive emigra-
tion policy that, he argued, should be aimed at using Miki’s “Kyōryokutai” 
as an institutional mechanism to direct Japan’s alleged overpopulation into 
parts of continental East Asia.105 In arguing this stance, Mitsukawa even 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon 2007: 
85–100, at 92–3. 
104 The Pan-Asian movement also proposed programs for emigration to Manchuria during 
the early 1920s, where it wanted settler colonies to be erected. Yet the Taishō govern-
ment did not respond to the proposal but allowed the debate to continue that the 
proposal raised. On the proposal see Sven SAALER: “Pan-Asianism during and after 
World War I”, SAALER and Christopher W. A. SZPILMAN (eds): Pan-Asianism. A 
Documentary History, vol. 1, Lanham, MD: Rowland & Littlefield 2011: 255–69. 
KIMURA Kenji [木村健二], “Settling into Korea. The Japanese Expansion into Korea 
from the Russo-Japanese War to the Early Period of Annexation”, KIMURA, UCHIDA Jun 
and SUN Jae-Who: Settler Colonialism and Capitalism in Japan. Advances into Korea, 
Settling Down and Returning to Japan. 1905–1950, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity. Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies 2002 (Occasional Papers in 
Japanese Studies 2002, 3): 1–10. OKAZAKI Hisahiko 岡崎久彦: Komura Jutarō to sono 
jidai 小村寿太郎とその時代 (Komura Jutarō and His Age), PHP Kenkyū Jo PHP研
究所  2003: 307–08. UCHIDA Jun: “Settler Colonialism. Japanese Merchants under 
Colonial Rule in the 1920s”, KIMURA: Settler Colonialism (as above): 11–22. UCHIDA: 
Brokers of Empire. Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea. 1876–1945. Ph.D. Thesis, 
typescript, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 2005, esp. at 503–05 [published, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center 2011 (Harvard East Asian Mono-
graphs, 337)]. UCHIDA: “Between Collaboration and Conflict. State and Society in 
Wartime Korea”, KIMURA Masato and MINOHARA Tosh (eds): Tumultuous Decade. 
Empire, Society and Diplomacy in 1930s Japan, Toronto and Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press 2013: 130–60. 
105 The Shōwa Government supported specifically the emigration of farmers. See TAKUMU 
SHŌ 拓務省 (Ministry for the Promotion of Cultivation), Takumu Kyoku 拓務局 
(Office for the Promotion of Cultivation) (ed.): Manshū nōgyō imin no genkyō 満州農
業移民の現況, Takumu Kyoku 1937; 1938. TAKUMU SHŌ: Manshū nōgyō imin ni tsuite 
満州農業移民に就いて (On the Current Situation of Farmers Migrating to Manchuria), 
Takumu Shō, Takumu Kyoku 1938. In 1938, the government authorized a public 
opinion poll under the goal of testing the ready of rural populations to migrate to 
Manchukuo. See Manshū nōgyō imin ni kan suru shoshiryō 満州農業移民に関する諸
資料 (Collected Documents Relating to Farmers Migrating to Manchuria), Takumu 
Shō, Takumu Kyoku 1938 (Naigai shoshiryō 内外諸資料 (Collected Documents on 
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criticized the Meiji government which, in his view, had not given sufficient 
support to emigration for the purpose of generating additional Lebensraum, 
but had conceived its emigration policy merely as a mechanism to shovel out 
paupers. Thereby, Mitsukawa maintained, the Meiji government had suc-
ceeded to some degree in alleviating poverty inside Japan but it had created 
lost populations by directing the emigrants to the Americas rather than to 
dependencies in East Asia. By contrast, Mitsukawa expected that ‘peoples’ 
in East Asia would welcome Japanese colonists as immigrants because they 
appeared to him as ‘peoples’ of the same race, religion, principles of the 
conduct of life and emotionality. As long as Japanese colonists would re-
spect the moral guidelines of Pan-Asianism in conjunction with some com-
mon East Asian cultural traditions and would work towards the promotion of 
“civilization” in East Asia, they would not encounter resistance, Mitsukawa 
expected.106 Thus, the ideology of settler colonialism in conjunction with a 
perverted version of Pan-Asianism existed at the time when the Kwan-
tung-Army carried out its bomb attack in Manchuria.107 
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of Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley: University of California Press 1998: 54. Already in 
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湾と南洋 ｢南進｣問題との関連で (Taiwan and the South Pacific. Concerning the 
Problem of “Southward Expansion”), ŌE Shinobu 大江志乃夫 (ed.): Kindai Nihon to 
shokuminchi 近代日本と植民地 (Modern Japan and Colonialism), vol. 2, Iwanami 
Shoten 岩波書店 1992: 147–75. Hyung-Gu LYNN: “A Comparative Study of the Tōyō 
Kyōkai and the Nan‘yō Kyōkai”, Harald FUESS (ed.): The Japanese Empire in East Asia 
and Its Postwar Legacy, Munich: Iudicium 1998: 65–95, at 91. HATANO Sumio 波多野
澄雄: “Nihon kaigun to ‘nanshin’” 日本海軍と「南進」(The Japanese Navy and the 
“Southward Advance”), SHIMIZU Hajime 清水元 (ed.): Ryō taisen kanki Nihon. Tōnan 
Ajia kankei 両大戦間期日本・東南アジア関係 (Japan between the Two World Wars. 
Relations with Southeast Asia), Ajia Keizai Kenkyū Jo アジア経済研究所 1986: 
207–36. 
106 MITSUKAWA Kametarō: Man Mō tokushusei no kaibō 満蒙特殊性の解剖 (Analysis of 
the Special Features of Manchuria and Mongolia), Kyō A Kaku 興亜閣 1931: 27. For 
the context see HASEGAWA Yūichi 長谷川雄一: Kindai Nihon no kokusai ninshiki 近
代日本の国際認識 (International Concepts of Modern Japan), Ashi Shobō 芦書房 
2016: 85–120. SZPILMAN: Kindai (note 88): 77–178. Urs Matthias ZACHMANN: “Race 
and International Law in Japan’s New Order in East Asia. 1938–1945”, Rotem KOWNER 
and Walter DEMEL (eds): Race and Racism in Modern East Asia. Western and Eastern 
Constructions, Leiden: Brill 2013 (Brill’s Series in Modern East Asia in a Global 
Historical Perspective, 1): 453–71. 
107 ZACHMANN: Völkerrechtsdenken (note 5): 171–72. 
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In terms of the history of ideology, the use of settler colonialism was an 
adaptation of early modern strategies of colonial expansion that had occurred 
out from Europe mainly to the Americas during the sixteenth, seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries.108 Within Japan, this type of expansionist ideology 
had no predecessor and could not be connected with any manifest process of 
the expansion of rule. Settler colonialism thus became applied to Japan as a 
mere concept transferred across cultures. Yet, although he used German 
Lebensraum ideology, Mitsukawa did not adapt all of its implications. Thus 
he did not underwrite the claim, inherent in the German Lebensraum ideol-
ogy, that the settlers had some fictitious entitlement to impose themselves 
upon allegedly inferior ‘peoples’, expel them from their places of habitation 
and even put them to death. Instead, in his radically perverted version, 
Mitsukawa used Pan-Asianism merely as cheap propaganda in an attempt to 
justify Japanese aggression in China.109 
To sum up the results so far, the Meiji and subsequent governments em-
ployed a concept of colonialism of European provenance, modified and fit-
ted it into their own ideological frameworks. First, they responded to the 
regime colonialism, to which they became exposed, with an ideology of 
anti-colonial liberation, while internalizing the rhetoric of “civilization” to 
enforce harsh measures aimed at transforming structures of the state and 
society together with patterns of culture. Second, they applied their fusion of 
the rhetoric of “civilization” with anti-colonial liberation to an expansionist 
policy, successively applied to Taiwan, to continental East Asia and to the 
South Pacific. Third, they added policies of settler colonialism and dropped 
the ideology of anti-colonial liberation. Simultaneously, the perception of 
colonial rule changed. While, initially, colonial rule was the target of re-
sistance, it turned into a policy of manifesting great-power status. Whereas, 
in Europe, governments judged great-power status to be a condition for the 
strategic expansion of colonial rule, at the latest from 1884/85, in Japan, 
governments pursued their bid for colonial rule to the end of finding recog-
nition as a great power. However, this policy did not flow from a grand 
strategy, which the Meiji and subsequent governments were repeatedly ad-
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109 See the narrative survey by Gerhard KREBS: Japan im Pazifischen Krieg, Munich: Iudi-
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vised to formulate; instead, up until the beginning of the 1930s, they operat-
ed flexibly and sought to grab opportunities as they came along.110 
European Perceptions of Japan and Ideologies Legitimising Colonial Rule: 
Empire, “Civilization” and Great-Power Status 
In the European making, Japan was an empire already at the turn of the sev-
enteenth century in the technical meaning that the head of the Japanese gov-
ernment became styled “Emperor” appearing as king of kings. The use of the 
title “Emperor” was based on sixteenth-century Jesuit reports on Japan 
which had conveyed the impression that the Japanese archipelago was home 
to several “kingdoms”, whose rulers (daimyō) had appeared to European 
visitors as sovereigns, equipped with autonomous legislative competence.111 
In accordance with the sixteenth-, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Eu-
ropean hierarchy of rulers’ titles, any ruler positioned above “kings” was to 
bear the title “emperor” in the sense of a territorial suzerain, while no longer 
necessarily implying claims to universal rule.112 Therefore, not only the 
head of the Ming government in Beijing became addressed as “Emperor” but, 
from 1603 onwards, European authors regularly applied the title “Emperor” 
to the Shogun as the suzerain above the variety of daimyō.113 However, 
																																								 																				
110 For details see KLEINSCHMIDT: “Imperium” (note 25): 1331–32. 
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Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1974: 51–8, 69–74]. François CARON: 
Beschrijvinghe van het machtigh Coninckrijck Japan, Amsterdam: Hartgers 1645 
[further edns, ibid.: 1648; 1661; German version s.t.: CARON and Jodocus SCHOUTEN: 
Wahrhaftige Beschreibung zweyer mächtigen Königreiche, Jappan und Siam, Nurem-
berg: Endter 1663; another German edn, ibid. 1672; excerpt edited by Peter KAPITZA: 
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some reports transmitted the assumption that there had been some form of 
ancient dependence of Japan on China and that this dependence stood 
against the application of the imperial title for China and Japan alike.114 
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However, early in the eighteenth century, Engelbert Kaempfer took issue 
with this theory, claiming that Japan had had original independence from 
China, not merely in terms of politics but also of cultural history. Kaempfer 
used the authority of the Old Testament against the Jesuit theory of Japanese 
dependence on China, pointing to the myth of the building of the Babylonian 
Tower. He interpreted this myth as a genuine record of past events and ar-
gued that the subsequent populations of China and Japan had acquired their 
distinct languages through divine verdict while still at Babylon.115 Hence, he 
concluded, they had obtained their own distinct cultural and political identity 
already before they had reached the ultimate destination of their migrations 
out from Babylon. Kaempfer sought to strengthen this argument by letting 
the subsequent settlers of the Japanese archipelago move through Central 
Asia and Mongolia rather than through China.116 Kaempfer thus appears to 
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Wilhelm DOHM, Chap. I, part 6, vol. 1, Lemgo: Meyer 1779: 101 [reprint, edited by 
Hanno BECK, Stuttgart: Brockhaus 1964 (Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte der 
Geographie und der Reisen, 2)]. The same also in KAEMPFER: “Von dem Uhr sprung der 
Einwohner”, KAEMPFER, Heutiges Japan, edited by Wolfgang MICHEL and Barend Jan 
TERWIEL, Munich: Iudicium 2001 (Kaempfer, Werke, vol. 1): 67–78. Already 
SCHMALKALDEN: Reisen (note 113): 152 [entry into his diary s.d. 22 June 1650], had 
emphasized the differences between the Chinese and Japanese languages and scripts. On 
Kaempfer see Beatrice M. BODART-BAILEY: “Kaempfer Restor’d”, Monumenta Nip-
ponica 43 (1988): 1–33. BODART-BAILEY and Derek MASSARELLA (eds): The Furthest 
Goal. Engelbert Kaempfer’s Encounter with Tokugawa Japan, Folkestone: Global Ori-
ental 1995. Gerhard BONN: Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716). Der Reisende und sein 
Einfluß auf die europäische Bewußtseinsbildung über Asien, Frankfurt and Bern: Lang 
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have been among the first European visitors and observers to credit both 
China and Japan with legal sovereign equality and made explicit his view 
through the application of the imperial titles to the perceived highest secular 
rulers of both states.117 
Kaempfer also bequeathed to his European audience the view that Japan 
was a ‘closed state’ in the sense that the government restricted emigration, 
did not admit permanent diplomatic representatives at its court and insisted 
on regulating trade with other states. Kaempfer did not only justify these 
government acts as lawful but even praised them as contributions to the hap-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
2003 (Europäische Hochschulschriften, Series III, vol. 968). Yu-Ying BROWN: “Japa-
nese Books and Manuscripts. Sloane’s Japanese Library and the Making of the History 
of Japan”, Arthur MACGREGOR (ed.): Sir Hans Sloane, London: British Museum Press 
1994: 278–90. Detlef HABERLAND: Engelbert Kaempfer 1651–1716. A Biography, 
London: British Library 1996 [first published, Bielefeld: Westfalen-Verlag 1990]. HA-
BERLAND (ed.): Engelbert Kaempfer (1651–1716). Ein Gelehrtenleben zwischen Tradi-
tion und Innovation , Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2004 (Wolfenbütteler Forschungen, 
104). HABERLAND: “Die Verlorene Handschrift‘. Das Bild des bedeutenden neulateini-
schen Gelehrten Engelbert Kaempfer im Licht zweier neuer Funde”, Neulateinisches 
Jahrbuch 8 (2006): 397–408. HABERLAND and Karl August NEUHAUSEN: “Institutum 
nimirum est ... in Orientem proficisci. Ein wiederentdeckter programmatischer Brief 
Engelbert Kaempfers an Olof Rudbeck (1683)”, Neulateinisches Jahrbuch 12 (2010): 
105–89, at 113. Hans HÜLS: “Zur Geschichte des Druckes von Kaempfers Geschichte 
und Beschreibung von Japan und zur sozialökonomischen Struktur von Kaempfers 
Lesepublikum im 18. Jahrhundert”, Engelbert Kaempfers Geschichte und Beschreibung 
von Japan. Beiträge und Kommentar, Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer 1980: 
65-94. IMAI Tadashi [今井正]: “Anmerkungen zu Engelbert Kaempfers Geschichte und 
Beschreibung von Japan. Ein japanologischer Kommentar”, in: Engelbert Kaempfers 
Geschichte (as above): 95–163. IMAI: “Engelbert Kaempfer und seine Quellen”, 
“Sprachliche und landeskundliche Anmerkungen zu Engelbert Kaempfers Geschichte 
und Beschreibung von Japan”, Hans HÜLS and Hans HOPPE (eds): Engelbert Kaempfer 
zum 330. Geburtstag , Lemgo: Wagener 1982 (Lippische Studien, 9): 63–81, 83–121. 
Sabine KLOCKE-DAFFA, Jürgen SCHEFFER and Gisela WILBERTZ (eds): Engelbert 
Kaempfer (1651–1716) und die kulturelle Begegnung zwischen Europa und Asien, 
Lemgo: Landesverband Lippe. Institut für Lippische Landeskunde 2003 (Lippische 
Studien, 18). Josef KREINER: Kenperu no mita Nihon ケンペルの見た日本 (Japan as 
Seen by Kaempfer), Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai 日本放送出版協会 1996. Wolf-
gang MICHEL: “His Story of Japan. Engelbert Kaempfer’s Manuscript in a New Transla-
tion”, Monumenta Nipponica 55 (2000): 109–20. TAKAHASHI Teruaki [高橋輝暁]: “Ja-
pan und Deutschland im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert mit besonderer Berücksichtigung von 
Wirkungen des deutschen Japan-Forschers Engelbert Kaempfer”, Hans-Jürgen LÜSE-
BRINK (ed.): Das Europa der Aufklärung und die aussereuropäische Welt, Göttingen: 
Wallstein 2006: 208–27. Barend J. TERWIEL: “Kaempfer and Thai History. The Docu-
ments behind the Printed Texts”, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1 (1989), pp. 
64–80. 
117 KAEMPFER: Geschichte (note 116): 420. 
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piness of the Japanese state.118 Thus, contrary to twentieth-century retro-
spective interpretations,119 Kaempfer’s original text, as far as it can be re-
constructed, does not testify to the view that Japan was in a way isolated 
from the rest of the world. Instead, it simply featured a series of early seven-
teenth-century edicts through which the government in Edo had successively 
imposed restraints upon its subjects wishing to depart from the archipelago 
and against certain groups of foreign people seeking admission to the state, 
However, up until the edict against the admission of ships from foreign 
countries 異国船打払令  (Ikokusen uchiharai-rei, in force from 1825 to 
1842),120 the government in Edo did not promulgate any general prohibition 
against immigration and consistently refrained from fortifying the islands 
against unwarranted approaches from elsewhere.121 Based on Kaempfer’s 
																																								 																				
118 Engelbert KAEMPFER: Amoenitatum exoticarum politico-physico-medicarum fasciculi V, 
Fasc. 2, Relatio 14: “Regnum Japoniae optimâ ratione clausum”, Lemgo: Meyer 1712: 
478–502 [reprint, Tehran: International Organization for Social Services 1976]. KA-
EMPFER: Geschichte, vol. 2 (note 116): 395–96, 410–11, 412–13. 
119 Karl Wolfgang DEUTSCH: The Analysis of International Relations, third edn, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 1988: 195 [first published, ibid. 1968]. Kalevi Jaako HOLSTI: In-
ternational Politics. A Framework for Analysis, sixth edn, Englewood Cliffs: Prenti-
ce-Hall 1992: 86 [first published, ibid. 1967]. Thomas SCHLEICH: “Vom Warenum-
schlag zum Wissenstransfer. Die Anfänge der japanischen Öffnung zum Westen in der 
Phase des verschlossenen Landes (1640–1853)”, Thomas BECK, Annerose MENNINGER 
and Thomas SCHLEICH (eds): Kolumbus’ Erben. Europäische Expansion und übersee-
ische Ethnien im ersten Kolonialzeitalter, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft 1992: 217–45. Derek MASSARELLA: “Fact, Fiction and Economics. Some Reflec-
tions on Engelbert Kaempfer’s Contribution to Sakokuron”, Chūō Daigaku Jinbunken 
kiyō 中央大学人文研紀要 (Report of the Institute of Humanities, Chūō University) 64 
(2008): 143–157, at 150. Wolfgang SCHWENTKER: “Staatliche Ordnungen und Staats-
theorien im neuzeitlichen Japan”, in: Wolfgang REINHARD and Elisabeth MÜL-
LER-LUCKNER (eds): Verstaatlichung der Welt?, Munich: Oldenbourg 1999 (Schriften 
des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien 47): 113–32, at 117. 
120 Ronald P. TOBY: State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan. Asia in the Development 
of the Tokugawa Bakufu, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984: 168–230. TSUZUKI 
Chūshichi [都築忠七]: “Japan in 1825. A Crisis in Seclusion”, in: TSUZUKI: The Pursuit 
of Power in Modern Japan. 1825–1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000: 19–37. 
WAKABAYASHI: Anti-Foreignism (note 49): 59–68. 
121 It did so even against advice given to it with the Grotian argument that the sea was open 
that that, by consequence, any one could come to Japan from anywhere. See HAYASHI 
Shihei林子平: Kaikoku heidan 海国兵談 (Military Considerations about a Country 
Open to the Sea, not before 1785], Tonan Sha 図南社 1916: separate pagination, 
Preface, at 1; Book 1, at 1–3; several new edns, the latest, Daiichi Shobō 第一書房 
1976 [also edited by YAMAGISHI Tokuhei 山岸徳平 and SANO Masami 佐野正己: 
Shinpen Hayashi Shihei zenshū 新編林子平全集  (New Edition of the Collected 
works), vol. 1: Heigaku 兵学, Daiichi Shobō 第一書房 1978: 77–288; Facsimile of 
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text, however, the notion of the ‘closed state’ found its way into the Japanese 
lexicon as sakoku鎖国122 through an effort to translate into Japanese a ver-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
the edn of 1856, ibid.: 313–984]. The original of the edn of 1856 is in Munich: 
Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek (shelfmark: 4º L. jap. E59). Partly translated and edited by 
Friedrich LEDERER: Diskurs über die Wehrhaftigkeit einer Seenation, Munich: Iudicium 
2003: 100, 123, 125, 127, 251. Also partly translated by Donald KEENE: The Japanese 
Discovery of Europe. 1720–1830, second edn, Stanford: Stanford University Press 1969: 
39–45, 321–22 [first published, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1952]. For a study 
see AMINO Yoshihiko [網野善彦]: “Les Japonais et la mer”, Annales ESC 50 (1995): 
235–38. AMINO: Umi to rettō no chūsei 海と列島の中世 (The Sea and the Archipela-
go of the Middle Ages), Kōdan Sha講談社 2003. 
122 On Sakoku see Walter DEMEL: “Die politischen Ordnungen Japans und Chinas in der 
Wahrnehmung frühneuzeitlicher europäischer Reiseberichterstatter”, Thomas BECK, 
Marília DOS SANTOS and Christian RÖDEL (eds): Barrieren und Zugänge. Die Geschich-
te der europäischen Expansion. Festschrift für Eberhard Schmitt zum 65. Geburtstag, 
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 2004: 160–76. Kristof GLAMANN: Dutch-Asiatic Trade. 
1620–1740, Copenhagen: Danisch Science Press 1958 [second edn, The Hague: Nijhoff 
1981]. Grant Kohn GOODMAN: The Dutch Impact on Japan (1640–1853), Leiden: Brill 
1967. KAMIGAITO Ken’ichi 上垣外憲一: “Sakoku” no hikaku bunmei ron「鎖国」の比
較文明論 (The Civilization of the “Closed Country” Compared) , Kōdan Sha講談社 
1994. KATŌ Eiichi [加藤栄一], “The Japanese-Dutch Trade in the Formative Period of 
the Seclusion Policy”, Acta Asiatica 30 (1976): 34–84. KATŌ Hidetoshi [加藤秀俊]: 
“The Significance of the Period of National Seclusion Reconsidered”, Journal of Japa-
nese Studies 7 (1981): 85–109. Derek MASSARELLA: A World Elsewhere. Europe’s En-
counter With Japan in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century, New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press 1990: 329–69. NAGAZUMI Yōko [永積洋子]: “Japan’s Isolationist 
Policy as Seen Through Dutch Source Materials”, Acta Asiatica 22 (1973): 18–35. 
NAGAZUMI: “Sakoku” o minaosu 「鎖国」を見直す (The “Closed Country” Revisited), 
Kokusai Bunka Kōryū Suishin Kyōkai 国際文化交流推進協会 1999 (Shirīzu Kokusai 
Kōryū シリーズ国際交流 International Communication Series), 1). Ulrich PAULY: 
Sakoku. Zu den Hintergründen von Japans Weg in die nationale Abschließung unter den 
Tokugawa, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens 1989 (OAG 
aktuell, 36). TASHIRO Kazui [田代和生]: “Foreign Relations during the Edo-Period. 
Sakoku Reexamined”, Journal of Japanese Studies 8 (1982): 283–306. Ronald P. TOBY: 
“Reopening the Question of Sakoku”, Journal of Japanese Studies 3 (1977): 323–64. M. 
E. van UPSTALL: “Dutchmen and Japanese in the Eighteenth Century”, Jurrien van 
GOOR (ed.): Trading Companies in Asia. 1600–1830, Utrecht: Hes en de Graaf 1986 
(Hes Studies in Colonial and Non-European History, 3): 107–26. On the conceptual 
history of “sakoku” see W. J. BOOT: “‘Sakoku ron’. 18 seiki no sei ni okeru Nihon. 
Nihon ni okeru 18 seiki”「鎖国論」18世紀の生における日本.日本における 18世紀 
(The “Treatise on the Closed Country”. The Presence of the Eighteenth Century in 
Japan. Japan in the Eighteenth Century), Rangaku no furontia. Shizuki Tadao no sekai 
蘭学のフロンティア. 志筑忠雄の世界 (The Frontier of Dutch Studies. The World of 
Shizuki Tadao), Nagasaki Bunken Sha長崎文献社 2007: 71–81. ŌSHIMA Akihide 大
島明秀: “19 seiki Kokugakusha ni okeru Shizuki Tadao yaku ‘Sakoku ron’ no juyō to 
Hirata Kokugaku” 19世紀国学者における志筑忠雄訳「鎖国論」の受容と平田国学 
(The Reception of Shizuki Tadao’s Translation of “Closed Country” among Nine-
teenth-Century National Philologists and the Hirata School of National Philology), 
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sion of Kaempfer’s text.123 While Kaempfer’s notion of the ‘closed state’ 
triggered few responses in the eighteenth century, it shaped the minds of 
European and North American policy-makers and intellectuals throughout 
the nineteenth century, suggesting the view that Japan was an island empire 
closed to international trade and thus should become “open” to unrestricted 
trade through efforts of governments in Europe and North America.124 
In conjunction with the notion of the ‘closed state’, Kaempfer’s applica-
tion of the imperial style to the Shogun set the standard for the nine-
teenth-century political terminology and provided the platform for interven-
tionist strategies of European and North American governments. The impe-
rial terminology remained in use even though the imperial title was never 
claimed by any Japanese government in official correspondence up until and 
even beyond the Meiji Restoration. Instead, the title most frequently used for 
the Shogun in messages to European governments or what the Japanese 
government considered to be the government of a state in Europe,125 was 
Taikun 大君, sometimes also Kun’ō 君王, manifesting the highest rank of 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Nihon bungei kenkyū 日本文芸研究 (Studies in Japanese Culture and Arts) 57 (2005): 
39–63. ŌSHIMA: “Kinsei kōki Nihon ni okeru Shizuki Tadao juyō ‘Sakoku ron’ 近世後
期日本における志筑忠雄受容「鎖国論」” (The Reception of Shizuki Tadao’s “Closed 
Country” in Japan during the Late Early Modern Period), Yōgaku洋学 (Annals of the 
Society for the History of Western Learning in Japan) 14 (2005): 1–32. ŌSHIMA: “Sa-
koku” to iu gensetsu「鎖国」という言説 (Views about the so-called “Closed Country”), 
Kyōto: Mineruva Shobō ミネルヴァ書房 2009: 137–204. 
123 Engelbert KAEMPFER: De beschrijving van Japan, Amsterdam: Gosse and Neaulme 
1729 [new edn, Amsterdam and the Hague: de Jonge 1733]. This version, drawn on the 
English translation of Kaempfer’s original, did contain the chapter on Japan as a “closed 
state” from the Latin version of 1712. The Dutch version of Kaempfer’s text may have 
been used already in the 1790s as the basis for a translation of Kaempfer’s views on 
Japan by MATSUDAIRA Sadanobu 松平定信 in the latter’s essay on the collection of 
useful Dutch books. For this text see HIRAISHI Naoaki [平石直昭]: “E. Kaempfer’s 
Treatise of Japan’s Policy of Seclusion and Its Influence on Japan’s Decision to Open 
the Country”, Japonica Humboldtiana 3 (1999): 167–81, at 171. A reproduction of the 
title of the chapter on “Sakoku” in the text translated by Shizuki Tadao 志筑忠雄 in 
1801 is in Josef KREINER: “Kaempfer und das europäische Japanbild”, Sabine KLOK-
KE-DAFFA, Kaempfer (note 116): 259. An original of the printed edn is on display in the 
Edo-Tokyo-Museum. An edited version of Shizuki’s text is in Bunmei genryū sōsho 文
明源流叢書 (Library of Sources on Civilization), vol. 3, Kokusho Kankō Kai 国書刊
行会 1914: 182–227. 
124 KLEINSCHMIDT: Legitimität (note 24): 168–72. Bernard SEMMEL: The Rise of Free Trade 
Imperialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1970. 
125 Such as the VOC, which was ranked as the government of some kingdom of the Nether-
lands throughout most of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. 
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an executive ruler within but not the head of the state.126 Hence, it was not 
possible within Japanese constitutional theory to equate the Taikun with 
“Emperor”. While the discrepancies between Japanese and European usages 
of titles did not matter as long as only the Dutch East India Company (VOC) 
maintained official relations between a European state and Japan, the issue 
of the choice of titles turned into a political problem of fundamental scale 
once governments in Europe and North America decided to dispatch official 
missions to Japan late in the eighteenth century to “open” the state.127 From 
																																								 																				
126 Kaempfer used the terms “Spiritual Emperor”, “born popes” or “the present pontifical 
idol” for the Tenno, the latter of which Kaempfer’s translator Johann Gaspar Scheuchzer 
turned into the formula “Japanese Pope”. KAEMPFER: Japan, edited by MICHEL (note 
116): 124, 125, 174. KAEMPFER: The History of Japan, vol. 1, London: Woodward & 
Davis 1727: 206 [further edns, London: MacLehose 1906; Kyōto: s.n. 1929; Yūsho Dō 
有書道 1977; reprints of the edn of 1906, New York: AMS Press 1971; Richmond, SY: 
Japan Library 1993]. By contrast, Kaempfer styled the Shogun as the temporal emperor, 
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Journal N.S. 6 (1831): 192–207, at 196. KLAPROTH: “Notice sur le Japon”, Nouvelles 
annales des voyages, Series 2, vol. 29 [= vol. 59 of the entire series] (1833): 281–311, at 
295–96. On Klaproth see Hartmut WALRAVENS: Julius Klaproth (1783–1835). Leben 
und Werk, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz 1999 (Orientalistik-Bibliographien und Dokumen-
tationen, 3). WALRAVENS: Zur Geschichte der Ostasienwissenschaften in Europa. Abel 
Rémusat (1788–1832) und das Umfeld Julius Klaproths (1783–1835), Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz 1999 (Orientalistik-Bibliographien und Dokumentationen, 5). But these 
criticisms remained confined to the academic “Orientalist” discourse and did not 
penetrate into general public conscience. 
127  William George ASTON: “Russian Descent in Saghalien and Itorup in the Years 
1806–7”, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan. First Series, vol. 1 (1874): 86–95 
[reprinted, ASTON: Collected Works, edited by Peter Francis KORNICKI, vol. 1, Bristol 
and Tokyo: Ganesha1997: 19–29]. Glynn BARRATT: Russia in Pacific Waters. 
1715–1825, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 1981. Edgar FRANZ: 
“Siebold’s Endeavors in the Year 1852 to Induce the Russian Government to Initiate 
Activities for the Opening of Japan”, Bunka文化 (Culture, Tōhoku University 東北大
学), vol. 66, nrs 1–2 (2002): 167–86. FRANZ and YOSHIDA Tadashi [吉田忠]: “Philipp 
Franz von Siebold’s Correspondence with Leading Russian Diplomats 1852–1853 in the 
Context of the Endeavors to Open Japan for Trade and Navigation”, Tōhoku Ajia kenkyū 
東北アジア研究 (Tōhoku Asian Studies) 7 (2003): 125–46. FRANZ: “Siebold’s Influ-
ence on the Instructions of the Russian Government to Admiral Putiatin, Commander of 
the Russian Expedition to Japan in 1852”, Bunka 文化 (Culture, Tōhoku University 東
北大学), vol. 66, nrs 3–4 (2003): 137–56. FRANZ: Philipp Franz von Siebold and Rus-
sian Policy and Action on Opening Japan to the West in the Middle of the Nineteenth 
 Harald Kleinschmidt 
Japonica Humboldtiana 20 (2018) 
172 
the European and North American point of view, states had to be “opened” 
for unrestricted international trade through government activity establishing 
formal inter-state relations on the basis of treaties under international law 
rather than through privileges arranged with trading companies. After the 
Bakufu had refused to accept several expeditions sent to Japan from Russia, 
the USA and the UK between the 1780s and the 1840s, the US government, 
in 1851,128 decided to draw on Kaempfer’s application of the imperial title 
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to the Shogun.129 Consequently, the US government made what appeared to 
itself as the self-evident decision to direct the mission to Edo in 1853 and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Diplomatic Papers, vol. 2, Hanover, NH, and London: University Press of New England 
1983: 290–91. 
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an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan under the Commodore M[atthew] 
C[albraith] Perry, United States Navy, Washington: Beverly Tucker and New York: 
Applteton 1856; newly edited, New York: Appleton 1857; reprints, New York: Cow-
ard-McCann 1952; New York: AMS Press 1967; Stroud: Nonsuch 2005]. Henry 
Franklin GRAFF (ed.): Bluejackets with Perry in Japan. A Day to Day Account Kept by 
Masters Mate John R. C. Lewison and Cabin Boy William B. Allen, New York: New 
York Public Library 1952 [reprint, edited by William Gerald BEASLEY, Richmond, SY: 
Japan Library 2002 (The Perry Mission to Japan 1854–1854, vol. 4)]. Wilhelm HEINE: 
Reise um die Erde nach Japan, Leipzig: Purfürst 1856 [English version, edited by Fre-
deric TRAUTMANN, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1990]. Henry HEUSKEN: 
Japan Journal 1855–1861, edited by Jeannett C. van der CORPUT and Robert Arden 
WILSON, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press 1964 [reprint, Ann Arbor: 
University Microfilms International 1988]. Richard HILDRETH: Japan as it is and was, 
Boston: Phillips & Sampson 1855 [newly edited by Ernest Wilson CLEMENT, London: 
Kegan, Paul & Co 1907; reprint of the original, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources 
1973]. Joseph Henrij LEVYSSOHN: Bladen over Japan, The Hague: Belinfante 1852: 
66–124. Roger PINEAU (ed.): The Japan Expedition. 1852–1854. The Personal Journal 
of Commodore Matthew [Calbraith] Perry, Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press 
1968 (Smithsonian Institution Publication, 4743) [reprint, Richmond, SY: Japan Library 
2002]. Edward Yorke MCCAWLEY: With Perry in Japan. The Diary, edited by Allan 
Burnett COLE, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1942. James MORROW: A Scientist 
with Perry in Japan. The Journal, edited by Allan Burnett COLE, Chapel Hill: Universi-
ty of North Carolina Press 1947. Aaron Haight PALMER (ed.): Documents and Facts Il-
lustrating the Origin of the Mission to Japan, Washington, DC: Polkinhorn 1857 [re-
prints, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources 1973; edited by William Gerald BEASLEY, 
Richmond, SY: Japan Library 2002 (The Perry Mission to Japan 1853–1854, vol. 2)]. 
George Henry PREBLE: The Opening of Japan. A Diary of Discovery in the Far East. 
1853–1856, edited by Boleslaw SZCEZESNIAK, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 
1962. John SEWALL: The Logbook of the Captain’s Clerk. Adventures in the China Seas, 
Bangor, ME: Glass 1905. J. W. SPALDING: The Japan Expedition, New York: Redfield 
and London: Sampson Low 1856 [reprint, edited by William Gerald BEASLEY, 
Richmond, SY: Japan Library 2002 (The Perry Mission to Japan 1853–1854, vol. 3); 
another reprint, Ganesha 2007 (Japan in English. Key Nineteenth-Century Sources on 
Japan. 1850–59, Second Series, vol. 42)]. John Glendy SPROSTON: A Private Journal, 
edited by SAKANISHI Shio [坂西志保], Sophia University 1940 [reprint, Sophia Univer-
sity and Tuttle 1968; another reprint, edited by William Gerald BEASLEY, Richmond, 
SY: Japan Library 2002 (The Perry Mission to Japan 1853–1854, vol. 5)]. Bayard 
TAYLOR: A Visit to India, China and Japan in the Year 1853, edited by George 
Frederick PARDON, London: Sampson Low and Edinburgh: Blackwood 1859 [first 
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request the signing of a formal treaty with the Shogun on the establishment 
of peace, friendship and trade.130 It did so in pursuit of the positivist expec-
tation that Japan was not a member of the “international legal community” 
and that the treaty was required as the tool for laying the legal foundations 
for the establishment of diplomatic relations. Following US precedence, all 
subsequent missions except the British expedition arriving under unusual 
conditions at Nagasaki in 1854,131 moved to Edo under the postulate that 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
published, New York: Putnam and London: Sampson Low 1856; reprint, Ganesha 2002 
(Japan in English. Key Nineteenth-Century Sources on Japan. 1850–59. First Series, 
vol. 2)]. Robert TOMES: The Americans in Japan. An Abridgment of the Government 
Narrative of the US Expedition to Japan under Commodore Perry, New York: Appleton 
1857 [reprints, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources 1993; Richmond, SY: Japan Library 
2002]. 
130 On the treaty negotiations see: HAWKS: Narrative (note 129): 239–40, 244, 256–57, 
259–60. PINEAU: Expedition (note 129): 105, 168–69. TAYLOR: Visit (note 129): 197, 
211. Samuel Wells WILLIAMS: “A Journal of the Perry Expedition to Japan”, edited by 
Frederick Wells WILLIAMS, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan. First Series, 
vol. 37, part II (1910): 129 [reprint, edited by William Gerald BEASLEY, Richmond, SY: 
Japan Library 2002 (The Perry Mission to Japan 1853–1854, vol. 6)]. The US Minister 
of the Navy, James Cochrane DOBBIN, had opted for defensive negotiation tactics in his 
letter to Perry dated 14 November 1853, United States 33rd Congress, Second Session, 
Senate, Correspondence Relative to the Naval Expedition to Japan, Document Nr 34, 
Washington, DC: GPO 1853: 57. Japanese reactions towards Perry‘s negotiation tactics 
have been recorded in comments by TOKUGAWA Nariaki 徳川斉昭 (dated 14 August 
1853) and II Naosuke 井伊直弼 (dated 7 October 1853), Select Documents on Japa-
nese Foreign Policy. 1853–1868, edited by William Gerald BEASLEY, London: Oxford 
University Press 1955: 102–03, 106, 118–19 [reprints, ibid. 1967; Richmond, SY: Japan 
Library 2002 (The Perry Mission to Japan 1854–1854, vol. 2)]. For criticism of Perry’s 
tactics on the US side see the comments by John RODGERS: Yankee Surveyors in the 
Shogun’s Seas, edited by Allan Burnett COLE, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1947: 61–2 [reprint, New York: Greenwood 1968]. WILLIAMS: “Journal” (as above): 
129, 158. For the production of the first version of the treaty, as written by Perry, see:: 
HAWKS: Narrative (note 129): 409–10. Dai Nihon ishin shiryō 大日本維新史料 
(Sources on the Meiji Restoration in Japan), vol. 2, part 3, Tōkyō Teikoku Daigaku 
Shiryō Hensan Jo 東京帝国大学史料編纂所 1882: 402 [microfiche reprint, Tōkyō 
Daigaku Shiryō Hensan Jo 東京大学史料編纂所  1997]. For studies of the 
negotiations see MITANI, Escape (note 41): 182–98. MITANI: “The Transformation of 
Diplomatic Norms in East Asia during the Nineteenth Century. From Ambiguity to 
Singularity”, Acta Asiatica 93 (2007): 29–59. MCOMIE: Opening (note 41): 90–134, 
228–79. Conrad D. TOTMAN: “Political Reconciliation in the Tokugawa Bakufu. Abe 
Masahiro and Tokugawa Nariaki. 1844–1852”, Albert M. CRAIG and Donald Howard 
SHIVELY (eds): Personality in Japanese History, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press 1970: 180–208. 
131 The core sources on Stirling’s expedition are Correspondence Respecting the Late 
Negotiations with Japan, London: HSMO 1856 (Parliamentary Papers 1856, vol. 61 = 
Command Paper, 2077): 220–21, 225 Dai Nihon komonjo 大日本古文書 (Ancient 
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the Shogun as the “Emperor” was not merely the head of the government but 
also the head of the state. 
But Kaempfer’s interpretation stood in stark contrast against Japanese 
constitutional law according to which not the Shogun, but solely the Tennō 
was entitled to make out formal, legally binding arrangements with govern-
ments of other states. The clash between Japanese constitutional law and 
European political perceptions of Japan as a state entailed serious problems 
for the framing of agreements. Indeed, some of the treaties that the govern-
ment of the Shogun had been pressured to sign between 1854 and 1867, 
featured the imperial title for the Shogun in their non-Japanese versions.132 
After the Meiji Restoration, the imperial terminology gradually entered Jap-
anese political diction through the translation of the new term teikoku (帝国) 
into “Empire” in official texts written in English.133 Upon the enforcement 
of the Constitution of Japan, the title “Emperor” obtained official status.134 
At the latest by that time, the imperial terminology had become an integral 
part of official political diction as applied to the state. 
As Japan was an Empire, the imperial terminology was not available in 
legal and administrative diction for any territory under the control of the 
Japanese government outside the archipelago and therefore not considered as 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Records of Japan). Bakumatsu gaikoku kankei monjo 幕末大黒関係文書 (Records of 
the Relations with Foreign Countries at the End of the Tokugawa Period), vol. 7, nr 18, 
55, 79, 85, 133, 137, 141, 142, 148, 151, Tōkyō Teikoku Daigaku Bunka Daigaku 
Shiryō Hensan Gakari 東京帝国大学文科大学史料編纂係 1915: 39–63, 147–50, 
214–17, 247–53, 374–83, 385–90, 408–10, 410–18, 425–27, 439–41. Jan Hendrik 
DONKER CURTIUS: Bakumatsu Dejima mikōkai monjo 幕末出島未公開文書  (A 
Record of the Announcement of the Opening of Dejima at the End of the Tokugawa 
Period). Donkeru Kuruchiusu oboegakiドンケルクルチウス覚書 (The Memoirs of 
Donker Curtius), edited by VOS [-KOBAYASHI] Miyako フォス [小林] 美弥子, Ōrai 
Sha往来社 1992: 90–100. 
132 Bilateral agreements featuring the imperial title are the Treaty between Japan and the 
United Kingdom, dated 26 August 1858, Treaties (note 37): 111–29; also, CTS, vol. 119 
(1969): 402–12; the Treaty between France and Japan, dated 9 October 1858, in: ibid.: 
130–50; also, CTS, vol. 120 (1969): 8–20; the Treaty between Japan and Portugal, dated 
3 August 1860, ibid.: 151–70; also, CTS, vol. 122 (1969): 306–16. 
133 Early cases are recorded in the Treaty between Japan and the North German Con-
federation 1869 (note 39); and in the Treaty between Austria-Hungary and Japan 1869 
(note 40). 
134 Reproduced in TAKII Kazuhiro [瀧井一博]: The Meiji Constitution, International House 
of Japan 国際文化会館 2007: 150. The constitution had been explained to an English 
speaking audience already by ITŌ Hirobumi [伊藤博文 ]: Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the Empire of Japan, Igirisu Hōritsu Gakkō イギリス法律学校 1889 
[second edn, Chūō University 中央大学 1906; reprints, Westport, CT: Greenwood 
1978; Washington, DC: University Press of America 1979]. 
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part of the territory of the Japanese state. Therefore, even the staunchest 
propagandists of Japanese colonial expansion could not avail themselves of 
any part of imperialist rhetoric in connection with official government policy. 
Teikoku shugi 帝国主義, the dictionary equation for imperialism, remained 
applicable, as a rule, for strategies of the expansion of colonial rule by gov-
ernments other than that of Japan. The identification of colonialism with 
imperialism, postulated as a global feature, is characteristic of the Western 
concept of colonialism and, at the same time, the core element of the Japa-
nese perception of European colonial rule.135 
However, in its bid for the recognition as a great power, the Meiji gov-
ernment implemented the logic, though not the phraseology, of colonialism 
as imperialism. It did so in an effort to level Japan as a state up to the stand-
ard of “civilization”. In its relations with governments in East Asia and the 
Pacific, the Meiji government proclaimed the goal of acknowledging the 
sovereign equality of states, thereby implementing the European concept of 
sovereignty as the legal base for stipulating reciprocity and, simultaneously, 
rejecting traditional claims for suzerainty on the side of the Qīng govern-
ment.136 At the same time, the Meiji government started to emulate the Eu-
ropean and North American practice of using the treaty formulary to mani-
fest its great-power status by insisting upon the concession of extraterritori-
ality and consular justice in its treaties with China and Korea.137 In other 
																																								 																				
135 KŌTOKU: Teikoku shugi, Chap. 1 (note 90): 19. For an early research report on 
imperialism see YANAIHARA Tadao: Teikoku shugi kenkyū 帝国主義研究 (Research 
on Imperialism), Hakujitsu Shoin 白日書院 1948 [reprinted, Yanaihara Tadao zenshū 
矢内原忠雄全集, vol. 4, Iwanami Shoten 岩波書店 1963: 1–340]. For the Western 
concept of colonialism as imperialism see BAYLY: “Age” (note 34). 
136 Treaty between Hawaii and Japan, dated 19 August 1870, Treaties (note 37): 550–53; 
also, CTS, vol. 141 (1973): 448–50. Treaty between China and Japan, 1872, CTS, vol. 
144 (1973): 140–48. Treaty between Japan and Korea, dated 26 February 1876, CTS, 
vol. 150 (1981): 324–27. 
137 On extraterritoriality, including the operations of consular courts, see Pär CASSEL: 
Grounds of Judgment. Extraterritoriality and Imperial Power in Nineteenth-Century 
China and Japan, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. Richard Taiwon CHANG: The 
Justice of the Western Consular Courts in Nineteenth-Century Japan, Westport, CT: 
Greenwood 1984, esp. 52 (Contributions in Intercultural and Comparative Studies, 10). 
James E. HOARE: “Extraterritoriality in Japan”, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of 
Japan, Third Series, vol. 18 (1983): 71–97. HOARE: The Uninvited Guests. Japan’s 
Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements. 1858–1899, Folkestone: Japan Library 1994. 
Yuki Allyson HONJO: Japan’s Early Experience of Contract Management in the Treaty 
Ports, London: Japan Library 2003 (Meiji Japan Series, 10) [further edn, Hoboken: 
Taylor and Francis 2013]. Douglas R. HOWLAND: “The Foreign and the Sovereign. 
Extraterritoriality in East Asia”, HOWLAND and Luise WHITE (eds): The State of 
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words, the Meiji government, early on, implemented the European strategies 
of combining the legal fiction of sovereign equality with the bid for the es-
tablishment of hierarchies and its bid for recognition as a great power.138 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
Sovereignty. Territories, Laws, Populations, Bloomington: Indiana University Press 
2009: 35–55. Francis Clifford JONES: Extraterritoriality in Japan and the Diplomatic 
Relations Resulting from Its Abolition. 1853–1899, edited by Jerome D. GREEN, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press 1931 [reprint, New York: AMS Press 1970]. 
Turan KAYAOĞLU: Legal Imperialism. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the 
Ottoman Empire and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010. George 
Williams KEETON: “Extraterritoriality in International and Comparative Law”, Recueil 
des cours 72 (1948, Part I): 284–391. Christopher ROBERTS: The British Courts and Ex-
tra-Territoriality in Japan. 1859–1899, Leiden: Brill 2013; further edn, Leiden: Global 
Oriental 2014]. ROBERTS: “British Lawyers in Japan”, Hugh CORTAZZI (ed.): Britain 
and Japan, vol. 8, Leiden: Brill 2013: 147–63. Ian RUXTON: “The Ending of 
Extra-Territoriality in Japan”, Bert EDSTROM (ed.): Turning Points in Japanese History, 
Richmond, SY: Japan Library 2002: 84–101. Even after World War II, British lawyer 
KEETON: “Extraterritoriality” (as above): 332–36, 350–59, tried to defend the position 
that most of the nineteenth-century unequal treaties, constituting extraterritoriality, had 
been concluded voluntarily among fully sovereign states, that, by consequence, no force 
had been applied, and that, at the time of the conclusion of these treaties, most signatory 
partners of the European and US governments had not been members of the so-called 
“family of nations”, thus allegedly not ready for equal treatment under the law. Hence, 
he then continued to adhere to the view that the European public law of treaties among 
states was not applicable to agreements between European and the US governments on 
the one side and, on the other, governments of sovereign states in most other parts of the 
world. 
138 Still in 1901, after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the British, German 
and Russian governments agreed that the Meiji-Government did not have the financial 
resources required for an attack on Russia. See Frank C. LASCELLES: [Letter to the 
Marquis of Lansdowne, 25 August 1901], George Peabody GOOCH and Harold William 
Vazeille TEMPERLEY (eds): British Documents on the Origin of the War, vol. 1, London: 
HMSO 1926: 259–61, at 260: “As it was evidence that the Emperor was under the im-
pression that Japan had been badly treated by His Majesty’s Government, I said, against 
the risk of being indiscreet, that not only had His Majesty’s Government the earnest de-
sire of being on the best terms with Japan, but had even offered her pecuniary assis-
tance, which, however, had been refused, and had given rise to the suspicion that she 
might have come to terms with Russia. The Emperor replied that he had ascertained 
from His Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the Russian Government had been under no 
apprehension as to the possible action of Japan, as they had assured that His Majesty’s 
Government had declined to afford her financial assistance, and she was too poor to go 
to war, and this information had been confirmed by the German Legation at Tokio, who 
had reported that the Japanese had been grievously disappointed at the want of support 
they had received from His Majesty’s Government, who they considered had left them 
in the lurch at a critical moment. I asked His Majesty if he could give me the date, on 
which he received this information, which I could not help thinking was founded on 
some misunderstanding, but His Majesty did not remember the exact date, which I pre-
sume must have been about the time when the Russians were pressing the Chinese to 
sign the Manchurian Agreement.” 
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Explicitly, the Meiji government acted as the conveyor of “civilization” 
under the shelter of Pan-Asianism vis-à-vis Taiwan, China and Korea.139 
Yet, in striving to manifest its bid for recognition as a great power, the 
Meiji government left unused further elements of colonial ideologies. Euro-
																																								 																				
139 Henry Willard DENISON: [The Application of Japan’s New Treaties to Taiwan] [26 April 
1898, GAIMU SHŌ SHIRYŌ KAN 1,5,3,8, fol. 1v], and Montague KIRKWOOD: [The 
Position of Taiwan and the Constitution. 12. Juli 1898. GAIMU SHŌ SHIRYŌ KAN, 
1,5,3,8], in their opinions for the Meiji government, recommended the application of the 
British practice of colonial rule with the argument that the British government treated 
the inhabitants of the “dependencies, protectorates and colonies” under its control 
according to the degree of “civilization” ascribed to them. They also believed that the 
British government was appropriately enforcing laws “suited to the particular 
inhabitants, customs and condition of the country in question” (KIRKWOOD, as above: 
20r). Denison, a US citizen, took the view that most of the inhabitants of Taiwan were 
“unprepared for the enforcement of such a system of laws” as valid in Japan (DENSION, 
as above: 3r-v) and Kirkwood, a British national, was of the opinion that it would be 
impossible for a long time “to subject them to any complete system of law” (KIRKWOOD, 
as above, 7r). Accordingly, both of them advised the Meiji government to enact new 
laws only for the Japanese population residing in Taiwan, establish legal pluralism and 
thereby segregate the native population under native customs. Yet the Meiji government 
refused to act in accordance with these apartheid principles. On the issue see MIWA, 
“Theories” (note 76): 166. On the notion of legal pluralism and its enforcement under 
colonial rule see Lauren A. BENTON and Richard Jeffrey ROSS (eds): Legal Pluralism 
and Empires. 1500–1850, New York: New York University Press 2013. Ralf SEINECKE: 
Das Recht des Rechtspluralismus (Grundlagen der Rechtswissenschaft, 29), Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck 2015: 291–92. Peer ZUMBONSEN: “Law and Legal Pluralism. Hybridity in 
Transnational Governance”, Paulius JURČYS, Poul F. KJAER and YATSUNAMI Ren [八並
廉] (eds): Regulatory Hybridization in the Transnational Sphere, Leiden: Nijhoff 2013: 
49–71. On Korean responses towards Japanese colonial attitudes see Peter DUUS: The 
Abacus and the Sword. The Japanese Penetration of Korea. 1895–1910, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press 1995: 29–102, 169–200. HORI Kazuo 堀和
生: Chōsen kōgyōka no shiteki bunseki 朝鮮工業化の史的分析 (Historical Analysis 
of the Industrialization of Korea), Yūhikaku 有斐閣 1995 (Kyoto Daigaku keizaigaku 
sōsho 京都大学経済学叢書, 2): 266–308. KIM Han-Kyo: “The Japanese Colonial 
Administration in Korea”, Andrew NAHM (ed.): Korea under Japanese Colonial Rule, 
Kalamazoo: Western Michigan University. Center for Korean Studies 1973: 41–53. KU 
Dae-Yeol: Korea under Colonialism. The March First Movement and Anglo-Japanese 
Relations, Seoul: Seoul Computer Press 1985. LEE Chul-Woo: “Modernity, Legality and 
Power under Japanese Rule”, in: SHIN Gi-Wook and Michael ROBINSON (eds): Colonial 
Modernity in Korea, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center 1999: 21–51. 
MIWA Kimitada: “Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Departure from Asia”, Edmund SKRZYPCZAK 
(ed.): Japan’s Modern Century, Sophia University and Tuttle 1968: 1–26. André 
SCHMID: Korea between Empires. 1895–1919, New York: Columbia University Press 
2002: 103–19. HISHIDA: Position (note 41). HISHIDA: Japan among the Great Powers. A 
Survey of Her International Relations, London: Longman 1940. HISHIDA: “Manchurian 
Incident, Embargo and Neutrality, ‘Aggressor’, Kellogg Pact, League, American 
‘Birthright’”, Peter O’CONNOR (ed.): Japanese Propaganda, vol. 6: Retreat from 
Internationalism (1932–1939), Tōkyō and Folkestone: Global Oriental 2005. 
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pean and North American legal theorists created concoctions of ‘nomadism’ 
in conjunction with allegations of some lack of self-governing capability to 
justify gross interventions by European governments into domestic affairs of 
states in Africa, West, South and Southeast Asia as well as the South Paci-
fic.140 European and the US governments used these concoctions as pretexts 
																																								 																				
140 Lassa Francis OPPENHEIM: International Law, vol. 1, London and New York: Longman 
1905: 281 [second edn, ibid. 1912; third edn, edited by Ronald F. ROXBURGH, ibid. 
1920–1921; fourth edn, edited by Arnold Duncan MCNAIR, ibid. 1926; fifth edn, edited 
by Hersch LAUTERPACHT, ibid. 1935; sixth edn, edited by Hersch LAUTERPACHT, ibid. 
1944; seventh edn, edited by Hersch LAUTERPACHT, ibid. 1948; 1952–1953; eighth edn, 
edited by Hersch LAUTERPACHT, ibid. 1955; 1957; 1963; ninth edn, edited by Robert 
Yewdall JENNINGS and Andrew WATTS, Harlow: Longman 1992; 1996; 2008]. HOLT-
ZENDORFF: “Staaten” (note 60): 115–16. KUNZ: “Begriff” (note 19): 86–99. Franz von 
LISZT: Das Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt, ninth edn, Berlin: Haering 1913: 46–7 
[first published, ibid. 1898; second edn, ibid. 1902; third edn, ibid. 1904; fourth edn, 
ibid. 1906; fifth edn, ibid. 1907; sixth edn, ibid. 1910; seventh edn, ibid. 1911; eighth 
edn, ibid. 1912; tenth edn, Berlin: Springer 1915; eleventh edn, ibid. 1918; 1920; 1921; 
twelfth edn, edited by Max FLEISCHMANN, ibid. 1925; reprint of the original edn, 
Charleston: Bibliolife 2009], claimed that only states could be “subjects of international 
law”, and concluded apodictically: “Subjekte des Völkerrechts sind daher nicht: 1. No-
madisierende Stämme. Die mit ihnen geschlossenen Verträge können völkerrechtlich 
nicht als Rechtstitel für derivativen Erwerb, sondern nur als Beweismittel für tatsächli-
che Besitzergreifung in Betracht kommen. 2. Die von einzelnen oder von privaten Ge-
sellschaften ausgehenden kolonisatorischen Unternehmungen.” Likewise Pasquale 
FIORE: Nouveau droit international publique, second edn, vol. 1, Paris: Pédone 1885 
(Bibliothèque internationale et diplomatique, 11): 301 [first French edn, ibid. 1868; first 
published, Milan: Casa Editrice e Tipografica 1865; second Italian edn, Turin: Unione 
Tipografico Editrice 1879; 1882; 1884]: “Les peuples nomades, qu’ont une organisation 
politique et qui sont représentés par des chefs, ne peuvent pas prétendre à la personnalité 
internationale.” Hannis TAYLOR: A Treatise on International Public Law, Chicago: 
Callaghan 1901: 174, posited: “Protected states not persons in international law”. Ema-
nuel von ULLMANN: Völkerrecht, second edn, Tübingen: Mohr 1908 (Das öffentliche 
Recht der Gegenwart, 3): 313 [first published, ibid. 1898], proclaimed: “Übrigens ist 
seitens der zivilisierten Völker wilden und barbarischen Stämmen nicht einmal be-
schränkte völkerrechtliche Persönlichkeit eingeräumt.” Heinrich TRIEPEL: Die Zukunft 
des Völkerrechts, Leipzig and Dresden: Teubner 1916 (Vorträge der Gehe-Stiftung, Heft 
8, Nr 2): 12, called into question the decisions of the Berlin Africa Conference and pon-
tificated: “die Kongoakte von 1885, deren kulturelle Grundgedanken von unseren Geg-
nern zum Schaden der ganzen weißen Rasse so schmählich missachtet worden sind, 
kann in ihrer jetzigen Form schwerlich bestehen bleiben. Zahllose Einzelverträge, die 
unter den Kriegsparteien vor dem Kriege bestanden, werden durch die Friedensschlüsse 
und später ergänzt oder verändert werden.” For contemporary criticism of these 
positions see Henri BONFILS: Manuel de droit international public (droit des gens), sixth 
edn, Paris: Rousseau 1912: 360 [first published, ibid. 1894; second edn, ibid. 1898; third 
edn, ibid. 1901; 1904; fourth edn, ibid. 1905; fifth edn, ibid. 1908; seventh edn, ibid. 
1914; eighth edn, Paris: Waterlin 1921–1926)]. Charles CALVO: Le droit international 
théorique et pratique, fifth edn, vol. 1, Paris: Rousseau 1896 [first published, ibid. 1868; 
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to justify the conclusion and the ratification of treaties granting what they 
gave out as “protection” to their treaty partners in Africa, West, South and 
Southeast Asia as well as the South Pacific and tacitly aimed at occupation 
and even annexation. The governments of larger states in Europe and North 
America further associated the claimed status of “civilization” with 
great-power status as an indicator for hierarchies among member states of 
the “international legal community”.141 Within the “community”, the great 
powers appeared to be defined as governments of states with the capability 
of conducting ‘world politics’ (Weltpolitik) in the sense of making their de-
cisions felt at any spot on the globe at their own discretion and of creating 
perceptions of interdependence of their respective decisions with those of all 
other great powers, again with respect to any part of the globe.142 
In summary, claiming great-power status through the expansion of colo-
nial rule and regime colonialism was an integral element of those European 
and North American governments that sought to position themselves as 
agents of ‘world politics’ in the sense that this concept was given at the turn 
of the twentieth century. As members of the “international legal community”, 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
second edn, ibid. 1872; third edn, ibid. 1880; fourth edn, ibid. 1887]: 207–08: “les 
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considérés comme des États, mais on les traite sur le même pied; on conclut même des 
traités internationaux avec eux.” August Wilhelm HEFFTER: Das europäische Völker-
recht der Gegenwart, Berlin: Schroeder 1844: 145 [second edn, ibid. 1848; third edn, 
ibid. 1853–1855; fourth edn, ibid. 1861; fifth edn, ibid. 1867; sixth edn, ibid. 1873; se-
venth edn, Berlin: Schroeder und Berlin: Müller 1881; eighth edn, Berlin: Müller 1888]. 
For close contemporary studies see Louis DEHERPE: Essai sur le développement de 
l’occupation en droit international. Etablissement et déformation de l’œuvre de la 
conférence de Berlin 1885. LLD. Thesis, University of Paris 1903. Kurt FIEGE: Der Ge-
bietserwerb durch völkerrechtliche Okkupation. LLD. Thesis, University of Berlin 
1908. Karl Heimburger: Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit, vol. 1, Karlsruhe: Braun 1888: 
71. Gaston JÈZE: Etude théoretique et pratique sur l’occupation comme mode d’acquérir 
les territoires en droit international, Paris: Giard & Brière 1896. Charles SALOMON: De 
l’occupation des territoires sans maîtres. LLD. Thesis, University of Paris 1889. 
141 For a review of the nineteenth-century literature see Ernest NYS: “Le Concert Européen 
et la notion du droit international”, Revue de droit international et de législation 
comparée 31 (1899): 273–313. 
142 For explications see Otto HINTZE: “Imperialismus und Weltpolitik”, Internationale 
Wochenschrift für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Technik 1 (1907): 593–605, 631–36 [re-
printed, HINTZE: Staat und Verfassung, edited by Fritz HARTUNG, Leipzig: Koehler & 
Amelang 1941 (Hintze, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, vol. 1): 447–59; second edn of the 
Abhandlungen, edited by Gerhard OESTREICH, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 
1962]. HINTZE, “Imperialismus und Weltpolitik”, Die deutsche Freiheit (1917): 114–69. 
Kurt RIEZLER [using the pseudonym J. J. RUEDORFFER]: Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in 
der Gegenwart, Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1914: 185–88. 
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great powers were to make manifest their capability of conducting ‘world 
politics’ through the holding of colonial dependencies. They also sought to 
display their capacity, empirically recognizable in acts of agenda-setting for 
the making of multilateral treaties,143 of enforcing their regimes upon sov-
ereign states at the global level, through the establishment of international 
institutions and organizations with a global reach, such as the Universal 
Postal Union or the International Committee of the Red Cross. With regard 
to these matters of perceived global concern, great powers were expected to 
have willingness to promote the acceptance of norms of European and North 
American international law,144 the political clout to distribute and redistrib-
ute colonial dependencies145 and the naval capability to engage in war in 
any part of the globe.146 With regard to Japan, the British government al-
ready during the 1850s opted for a combined strategy of enforcing regime 
colonialism through diplomatic pressure147 as well as occasional deploy-
ments of naval force in response to activities launched from Japan and con-
sidered unfriendly by the British side.148 In response, the Meiji government, 
																																								 																				
143 Among many International Convention on the Rules and Customs of Land Warfare, 
dated 29 July 1899, in: CTS, vol. 187 (1981): 430–42; also edited by James Brown 
SCOTT: Texts of the Peace Conferences at the Hague 1899 and 1907, Boston: Ginn 
1908; also edited by Shabtai ROSENNE: The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 
and International Arbitration Reports and Documents, The Hague: Asser 2001. 
International Convention on Hygiene, dated 3 December 1903, CTS, vol. 194 (1981): 
295–349. E. van ERMENGEN: Rapport de la Première Commission [International 
Conference on Hygiene Dresden, 30 March 1893], London: BRITISH NATIONAL 
ARCHIVE, FO 1277. 
144 Friedrich Frommhold MARTENS: “[Contribution to the Debate about the Demands of 
Humanity and the Customs of the ‘Civilized’ Nations as the Principles from which 
Legal Sentences Relating to the Law of War are to be Derived, 20 June 1899]”, 
Conférence internationale de la paix. La Haye, 13 mai – 29 juillet 1899, vol. 3, The 
Hague: Nijhoff 1907: 120–21. 
145 Treaty between the German Empire and the United Kingdom, 1 July 1890, CTS, vol. 
173 (1981): 272–84. Treaty between France and the United Kingdom, 8 April 1904, 
CTS, vol. 195 (1981): 206–16. 
146 Richard HALDANE [Viscount of Haldane]: “[Memorandum, 25 March 1912]“, Johannes 
LEPSIUS, Albrecht MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLDY and Friedrich THIMME (eds): Das Schei-
tern der Haldane-Mission und ihre Rückwirkung auf die Tripelentente, nr 11422, Berlin: 
Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte 1927 (Die Grosse Politik der 
Europäischen Kabinette, 31): 205–08. 
147 OLIPHANT, Narrative (note 21): 248–49. 
148 On the Shimonoseki Incident 下関事件 of 1864 which appeared to have been pro-
voked by a Japanese armed squadron and entailed massive compensation claims from 
the side of the British government see Convention of Paris of 25 June 1864, Treaties 
(note 37): 227–29. Convention of Shimonoseki of 22 October 1864, ibid.: 230–33. 
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first devised a program for securing its outposts in the Pacific Ocean,149 and 
then entered into its protracted struggle for recognition as a great power. The 
well-known, explicitly anti-colonialist “Racial Equality Proposal”, first 
submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919150 and subsequently pur-
																																								 																				
149 For sources on British strategies regarding the Ogasawara-Islands as a group of such 
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Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 14 (1951): 261–84. KUBLIN: “Commodore Perry and 
the Bonin Islands”, United States Naval Institute Proceedings 78 (1952): 282–91. 
KUBLIN: “The Discovery of the Bonin Islands”, Annals of the Association of American 
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Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (1959): 67–84. Daniel LONG and Peter 
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the Bonin Islands”, LONG: English on the Bonin Islands, Durham, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press 2007: 3–24. MUROGA Nobuo [室賀信夫 ]: “Geographical 
Exploration by the Japanese”, Herman Ralph FRIIS (ed.): The Pacific Basin, New York: 
American Geographical Society 1967: 96–108. TANAKA Hiroyuki 田中弘之: “Edo 
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Pédone 1919: 6-11 [reprint, London: Forgotten Books 2018]. RŌYAMA Masamichi: 
Foreign Policy of Japan. 1914–1939, Institute of Pacific Relations. Japanese Council 
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sued through various venues during the 1920s and again towards the end of 
the Pacific War,151 can be understood as an instrument to manifest Japanese 
great-power agenda-setting capability at the international level. 
European Responses to the Japanese Concept of Colonialism 
During the period leading up to World War I, these expansionist policies 
peaked during the Russo-Japanese War, fought initially over control of the 
Korean Peninsula. Upon its end, the war emerged as the turning-point in the 
European assessment of the fighting power of the Japanese armed forces, 
when compared to their Russian adversaries. The forceful anti-colonialist 
push of Pan-Asianism had been noticed in Europe already during the Si-
no-Japanese War of 1894/95, then provoking vague fears that European 
positions in East Asia might be challenged.152 Russian defeat in 1905 ap-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
1941 (Far Eastern Conflict Series, 7): 28 [reprint, Westport, CT: Greenwood 1975]. On 
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clamations by the Foreign Minister); Shigemitsu gaimu daijin enzetsu shū 重光外務大
臣演説集 (Collected Addresses by Foreign Minister Shigemitsu), 59–66, at 62–3. 
Likewise Japonicus: “The Pacific Charter”. Japonicus: The Pacific Charter and Other 
Papers, The Nippon Times 1944: 1–20, at 12 [first published, Contemporary Japan, vol. 
13, nr 3 (1944)]. AYDIN: Politics (note 83): 141–45. For references to the 1920s see 
MATSUSHITA Masatoshi [松下正寿]: Japan in the League of Nations, New York: 
Columbia University Press 1929 (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law 
[Columbia University], 314): 162, 164. For a study see ZACHMANN: “Race” (note 106). 
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Betrachtungen, Berlin: Boll & Pickart 1895: 26: “Der Sieg über Rußland [in Korea] be-
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peared to strengthen these anxieties with what specifically British and Ger-
man military analysts took to be material evidence suggesting that the Rus-
sian armed forces were lacking offensive capacity. Whereas these analysts 
scaled down the likelihood of a Russian attack on a state in Central Europe 
due to apparently wavering ‘moral determination’ of the Russian fighting 
force,153 they upgraded the likelihood of a Japanese attack on European 
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positions in continental Northeast Asia.154 In turn, this prospect had impli-
cations for war planning mainly in the German Empire. For the perceived 
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Kuropatkin’s chief care seems to have been at first to delay and subsequently to secure 
his retreat rather than to stake his last man in a great bid for victory.” For studies see 
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digms. Comparing the British and German Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese 
War”, Journal of Military History 56 (1992): 389–401. HIRAMA Yōichi 平間洋一: 
Nichi Ro sensō no sekai wa dō hōjita ka 日露戦争を世界はどう報じたか (How Did 
the World Respond to the Russo-Japanese War?), Fuyō Shobō 芙蓉書房 2010: 137–42. 
David JONES: “Military Observers, Eurocentrism and World War Zero”, David WOLFF, 
Steven G. MARKS, Bruce W. Menning, David SCHIMMELPENNINCK VAN DER OYE, John 
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152): 113, who argues that the German Imperial Government was aware of the vulnera-
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by British military attaché in Berlin, Philip Dumas, dated 24 May 1906 [London: BRIT-
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declining probability of a Russian attack on Central Europe seemed to sup-
port the conclusion that, under the constraints of the presumed secret mili-
tary alliance between France and Russia, German armed forces might be in a 
position of attacking France on their western front without having to fear a 
Russian relief attack on their eastern front.155 In other words, the victory of 
the Japanese over the Russian armed forces in Manchuria and the Western 
Pacific had repercussions on German plans regarding ‘war against France’. 
The latter three words happened to form the title of the notorious memoran-
dum which the Chief of the German General Staff of the Army, General 
Alfred von Schlieffen, wrote at the turn of the year 1906, when he was about 
to retire from his office. The text, now widely regarded as Schlieffen’s tes-
tament to his successor, the younger Moltke, has been known as the ‘Schlie-
ffen Plan’ from the 1920s.156 
Schlieffen’s memorandum marked the final step in a longer process of the 
successive revision of the principles of German military planning, which had 
started in 1891, when Schlieffen took over the office from his hapless pre-
decessor Count Waldersee, and consisted essentially in a plea for the in-
crease in military spending to the end of achieving superiority over the 
French armed forces. The older strategic design, in force before Schlieffen’s 
incumbency, had envisaged a two-front war, beginning with a massive attack 
on Russia before moving against France. While in office, Schlieffen took a 
series of measures aimed at shifting the focus on France. He began to con-
sider as unimplementable the design of seeking to defeat Russia before turn-
ing to France, thereby calling it into question altogether. Schlieffen based his 
argument on the observation that the Russian military and political leader-
ship would, in the case of defeat at its western front, withdraw to the east, 
regroup the armed forces and launch a counterattack and that, in this case, 
swift action against France was not a possible choice.157 In a further memo-
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randum, dated 1892, Schlieffen proposed a joint Austrian-German offensive 
campaign against Russia, but the government rejected this proposal.158 By 
1905, however, the General Staff came to expect that the German armed 
forces would suffice to stand against a combined invasion by Russian and 
French forces, that the divided Russian fighting force could be defeated with 
the German peacetime contingents deployed on the eastern front and that, by 
consequence, the main fighting force could be shifted to the western front 
against France.159 The General Staff even came to the conclusion that, Rus-
sia’s military strength failing due to its defeat in 1905, a French preventive 
attack on Germany was unlikely. This was so, the General Staff believed, 
because Russia, even as France’s alliance partner, was not ready for an of-
fensive move against the German Empire. Consequently, the German side 
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Deutschland die Offensive gegen einen oder den anderen der beiden Verbündeten 
ergriffen haben sollte. Nach Abzug der in Ostasien verwendeten sowie der zur 
Aufrechterhaltung der Ordnung im Innern zurückgehaltenen Truppenkörper verfügt 
Rußland gegen Deutschland über: die Neman-Armee, ... die Narev-Armee, ... die 
Mobile Reserve, Warschau. Nach den eingegangenen Nachrichten ist der allergrößte 
Teil des deutschen Heeres nach dem Westen abtransportiert. In den Provinzen Ost- und 
Westpreußen sind nur die dort im Frieden untergebrachten A[rmee] K[orp]s mit den 
dazu gehörigen Reserve- und Landwehrtruppen verblieben. Ein Teil derselben soll 
hinter der Angerapp, ein Teil bei Ortelsburg, ein dritter Teil bei Soldau stehen. Die 
Befestigungen an der Weichsel ebenso wie Königsberg und Lötzen haben ihre Kriegs-
besatzungen erhalten. Auch in Schlesien sollen nur Reserve- und Landwehrtruppen 
geblieben sein. Die russischen Streitkräfte in der Ostsee sind sehr gering. Der russische 
Oberbefehlshaber hat den Auftrag, die deutschen Gebiete rechts der Weichsel in Besitz 
zu nehmen und nach Überschreitung des Stromes auf Berlin zu marschieren.” [partly 
paraphrased by Terence ZUBER: “Der Mythos vom Schlieffenplan”, Hans EHLERT, 
Michael EPKENHANS and Gerhard P. GROß (eds): Der Schlieffenplan. Analysen und 
Dokumente, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich: Schöningh 2006 (Zeitalter der 
Weltkriege, 2): 45–78, at 52]; Schlieffen (as above): 2: “Die Formung des russ[ischen] 
Heeres gibt dem Feind Gelegenheit, mit allen seinen Kräften über eine Armee herzu-
fallen u[nd] sie zu schlagen. Dem wäre die Niemen Armee vor allem ausgesetzt, denn 
sie ist schwächer als der vereinigte Feind.” 
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expected that the French army, although prepared for war, would remain in 
defensive positions, most likely behind its line of fortifications on the French 
eastern front, would await a German attack and retaliate massively. The 
German side also assumed that the French military command had obtained 
intelligence concerning German plans for offensive action. The German side 
also postulated that the French command had drawn the conclusion that the 
German armed forces would not directly attack the French line of fortifica-
tions but would lead their right wing through Belgium to circumvent the 
French fortifications in the north and attack from the rear.160 Thus, Schlie-
ffen in 1905 assumed that German offensive action against France was the 
most likely scenario in an upcoming war, while continuing to exclude a 
German frontal attack on French defense lines.161 By implication, he argued 
for a sharp increase in military expenditures to upgrade the German armed 
																																								 																				
160 Helmuth GREINER: Welche Nachrichten besaß der deutsche Generalstab über Mobilma-
chung und Aufmarsch des französischen Heeres in den Jahren 1885–1914? Wie wurden 
sie ausgewertet und wie lagen die tatsächlichen Verhältnisse? Ms. Freiburg: BUN-
DESARCHIV-MILITÄRARCHIV, RH 61/398 = W 10/50267, fol. 001–157; fol. 95: “Eine 
französische Offensive, mit der bis zum Jahre 1904 gerechnet werden konnte, in diesem 
im Hinblick auf den russisch-japanischen Krieg nicht mehr wahrscheinlich. Es war 
vielmehr anzunehmen daß die Franzosen zu Beginn eines Krieges nicht sofort angreifen, 
sondern in einer Bereitstellung, wahrscheinlich hinter ihren Befestigungen den Angriff 
der Deutschen erwarten würden, obwohl sie vermuteten, daß deren rechter Flügel die 
Festungsfront nördlich umgehen werde.” 
161 SCHLIEFFEN: “Krieg” (note 156): 145–46 (of the edn by RITTER): “In einem Kriege 
gegen Deutschland wird sich Frankreich, besonders, solange es auf eine wirksame Un-
terstützung Rußlands nicht rechnen kann, voraussichtlich zunächst auf die Verteidigung 
beschränken. Für diesen Zweck hat es sich schon seit langer Zeit eine zum großen Teil 
dauernd ausgebaute Stellung vorbereitet, in welcher die großen Festungen Belfort, 
Epinal, Toul, Verdun die Hauptstützpunkte ausmachen.”; 147: “Ein Frontalangriff auf 
die Stellung Belfort – Verdun bietet daher wenig Aussicht auf Erfolg.” Even though the 
offensive strategy underlying Schlieffen’s memorandum of 1905 has been called into 
question, the extant papers from German General Staff deliberations as well as studies 
on the memorandum undertaken during the 1920s, taken together, amply suggest the 
offensiveness of the strategy Schlieffen was advocating on the eve of his retirement. For 
the debate see Terence ZUBER: “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered”, War in History 6 
(1999): 262–305. ZUBER: Inventing the Schlieffen Plan: German War Planning. 
1871–1914, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002. ZUBER: German War-Planning. 
1891–1914. Sources and Interpretations, Woodbridge and Rochester, NY: Boydell & 
Brewer 2004. ZUBER: The Real German War Plan. 1904–14, Stroud: History Press 
2011: esp. 212–13. FOLEY: “Schlieffenplan” (note 149): 101–16. Gerhard P. GROß: 
“There was a Schlieffen Plan. Neue Quellen”, Hans EHLERT, Michael EPKENHANS and 
GROß (eds): Der Schlieffenplan. Analysen und Dokumente, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna 
and Zurich: Schöningh 2006 (Zeitalter der Weltkriege, 2): 117–60. SELIGMANN, “Ger-
many” (note 152): 116–22. 
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forces in order to meet that challenge. Still, he comforted himself by contin-
uing to point to the weakness of Russian armed forces in the aftermath of the 
Russo-Japanese War and the ensuing revolution, while the General Staff 
conceded in 1906 that Russian troops on the western front had not declined 
in numbers and that the mobilisation potential for further contingents had 
been increased by the opening of a new railway line.162 Hence, by 1906, the 
“Schlieffen Plan” no longer comprised a feasible strategy. 
By 1911, the younger Moltke even felt compelled to revise Schlieffen’s 
assessment noting that the rearmament and modernisation of the Russian 
armed forces was taking place far more rapidly than Schlieffen had antici-
pated, specifically with regard to military organisation, the deployment of 
offensive artillery and the building of defensive fortifications on Russia’s 
western and southwestern borders. Moreover, the government had signifi-
cantly and at great costs improved its railroad network to allow speedy 
movement of troops across Russian territory.163 Moltke thus concluded that 
it was no longer possible to withdraw large contingents from Germany’s 
eastern front for a massive attack against France.164 Moltke also noted that 
																																								 																				
162 Deutsches Reich, Großer Generalstab: Zusammenstellung der wichtigsten Veränderun-
gen im Heerwesen Rußlands im Jahre 1906. 1906, Ms. Munich: BAYERISCHES HAUPT-
STAATSARCHIV, Abt. Kriegsarchiv, GSt. 207; 18: “Die zur Verwendung gegen Deutsch-
land und Österreich bestimmten Truppen sind mit Ausnahme der 17. und 33. I[nfante-
rie]-D[ivision] … rein zahlenmäßig wieder verfügbar. Ihr Aufmarsch an der Westgrenze 
läßt sich durch Benutzung der neu eröffneten Bahn Bologya – Siedlec beschleunigen. 
Unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen sind aber sehr erhebliche Kräfte zur Aufrechterhaltung 
der Ruhe im Innern des Reiches unentbehrlich. Auch ist die Schlagfertigkeit infolge der 
umfangreichen Truppenverschiebungen, die durch die inneren Unruhen, namentlich im 
Wolgagebiet, in Polen und in den Ostseeprovinzen nötig geworden sind, begrenzt.” 
163 On the revision see Annika MOMBAUER: Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the 
First World War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001. MOMBAUER: Origins 
(note 153). MOMBAUER: “Der Moltkeplan. Modifikation des Schlieffenplans bei glei-
chen Zielen?”, Hans EHLERT, Michael EPKENHANS and Gerhard P. GROß (eds): Der 
Schlieffenplan. Analysen und Dokumente, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna and Zurich: Schö-
ningh 2006 (Zeitalter der Weltkriege, 2): 79–99. 
164 Helmuth von MOLTKE: “Die militärpolitische Lage Deutschlands [Memorandum, dated 
2 December 1911, with notes by Imperial War Minister von Heeringen]”, Ms. Freiburg: 
BUNDESARCHIV–MILITÄRARCHIV, W 10/50279, Nr 59, fol. 013–30 [partly printed in 
MOMBAUER: “Moltkeplan” (note 163): 83]; fol. 023 = p. 11: “Rußland hat seit dem un-
glücklichen Feldzug gegen Japan seine Armee einer durchgreifenden Reorganisation 
unterzogen. Es hat seine bis dahin friedensmäßig bestehenden Reserven und Festungs-
typen in 6 neue Korpsverbände zusammengefaßt und sie zu aktiven Armeekorps umge-
wandelt. Es hat eine Veränderung in der Dislokation seiner Truppen vorgenommen, die 
ihre Mobilmachung erleichtert und ihre Verwendung im Kriegsfall begünstigt. Es hat 
mit großen finanziellen Opfern sein Eisenbahnnetz so ausgebaut, daß ein Aufmarsch an 
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the German government had failed to improve diplomatic relations with 
Russia but that, on the contrary, the British-Russian entente had been con-
cluded in 1907 and the Japanese-Russian rapprochement was on its way.165 
In what was to become his last written text, Schlieffen restated his convic-
tion that an initial massive strike against France was mandated and should 
not be deferred due to the Russian menace.166 
According to extant records still shedding light on the planning activities 
of the German General Staff, the Russo-Japanese War served as the back-
ground occurrence seeming to provide a basis for assessments of Russian 
military strength. These assessments shifted fundamentally: first from the 
expectation that Russian armies, operating under a weak central government, 
could be overcome with a massive offensive strike, in force up to 1902; to 
the skepticism that Russian forces could not be overcome, because they 
would withdraw to Russian hinterlands, before 1905; further to the optimism 
that Russian forces were too weak to present any real danger for Germany’s 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
der West- und Südwestgrenze sich in der Hälfte der Zeit vollziehen kann, die derselbe 
noch vor 5 Jahren beansprucht haben würde. Es hat ungeheuere Summen aufgewendet, 
um die Armee mit besserem Kriegsmaterial, besonders mit schweren Geschützen und 
mit einem modernen Feldgeschütz auszustatten. ... “ 
165 For studies see Peter A. BERTON: The Secret Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916. Ph.D. 
Thesis, typescript, New York: Columbia University 1956. BERTON: Case Study in In-
ternational Negotiations. The Russo-Japanese Alliance of 1916, Pittsburgh: Graduate 
School of Public and International Affairs, Pew Program in Case Teaching and Writing 
in International Affairs 1988. BERTON: “A New Russo-Japanese Alliance? Diplomacy in 
the Far East during World War I”, Acta Slavica Iaponica 11 (1993): 57–78. BERTON: 
“From Enemies to Allies. The War and Russo-Japanese Relations”, Rotem KOWNER 
(ed.): The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War, London: RoutledgeCurzon 2007 (Rout-
ledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 43): 78–87. BERTON: Russo-Japanese Re-
lations. 1905–1917. From Enemies to Allies, London and New York: Routledge 2012 
(Routledge Studies in the Modern History of Asia, 72): 53–69, 70–82. Bruce A. 
ELLEMAN: “The 1907–1916 Russo-Japanese Secret Treaties. A Reconsideration”, Ajia 
bunka kenkyūアジア文化研究 (Studies in Asian Culture) 25 (1999): 29–44. Ernest 
Batson PRICE: The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 Concerning Manchuria and 
Mongolia, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1933 [reprint, New York: AMS 
Press 1971]. 
166 Alfred Graf von SCHLIEFFEN: “Memorandum [Denkschrift, 28 December 1912]”, Copy 
Freiburg: BUNDESARCHIV–MILITÄRARCHIV, Foerster Papers, N 121/35 [first printed by 
RITTER: Schlieffenplan (note 156): 181–90; also in: MOMBAUER: “Moltkeplan” (note 
163): p. 88 = fol. 5: “Ganz Deutschland muss sich auf einen Gegner werfen, auf denje-
nigen, der der stärkste, mächtigste und gefährlichste ist, und das kann nur Frank-
reich-England sein! Österreich mag ohne Sorge sein: die russische gegen Deutschland 
bestimmte Armee wird nicht nach Galizien marschieren, bevor nicht die Würfel im We-
sten gefallen sind. Und das Schicksal Österreichs wird sich nicht am Bug, sondern an 
der Seine entscheiden.” 
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eastern front as a consequence of defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, in 1905; 
and eventually, by 1911, to the forecast that Russian forces were again 
strong enough to bind large German contingents on their eastern front. The 
German assessment of French strength changed correspondingly: starting 
with the expectation that France, backed by its perceived Russian alliance 
partner, would take offensive in a military confrontation with the German 
Empire prior to 1905; replaced in 1905 by a design according to which the 
German armed forces would launch a massive strike, carry the war deep into 
French territory and would succeed because the French army, unlike its Rus-
sia ally, did not have a hinterland to regroup; and, finally by 1911, giving 
way to the expectation that France would not launch an initial strike but wait 
for the German side to take the offensive. In essence, Moltke, from 1906, 
continued to adhere to the dogma of the war of annihilation, which Schlie-
ffen continued to expect from 1905 to his death.167 Thus, he insisted that 
modern armies were too large and too complex to allow long wars of attri-
tion. Fighting such wars, he claimed, might have been possible during the 
Russo-Japanese War but was unaffordable ‘luxury’ in Western Europe.168 
																																								 																				
167 Robert T. FOLEY: German Strategy and the Path to Verdun. Erich von Falkenhayn and 
the Development of Attrition. 1870–1916, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2005: 14–37. Jehuda Lothar WALLACH: The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation. The 
Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two 
World Wars, Westport, CT: Greenwood 1986 (Contributions in Military Studies, 45) 
[first published, Frankfurt: Bernhard & Graefe 1967; another edn, Munich: Deutscher 
Taschenbuchverlag 1970]. 
168 Alfred Graf von SCHLIEFFEN: “Schlußbesprechung [minutes of the discussion on the war 
game of 1905 in the General Staff, 23 December 1905]”, Ms. Freiburg: BUNDESAR-
CHIV–MILITÄRARCHIV, PH 3/653, fol. 001–18 [English version, SCHLIEFFEN: Writings 
(note 156)]; fol. 007: “Wir werden in einem künftigen Kriege mit langen Stellungen zu 
tun haben. Die Möglichkeit, mit wenigen Kräften in einer einigermaßen verstärkten 
Stellung auch einem weit überlegenen Feinde Widerstand zu leisten, wird leicht zu einer 
vermehrten Auflage von Positionskriegen führen. Das zeigt der russisch-japanische 
Krieg. Hinten in der Mandschurei mag man monatelang in uneinnehmbaren Stellungen 
sich gegenüber liegen. Im westlichen Europa kann man sich den Luxus einer solchen 
Kriegführung nicht erlauben. Die Maschine mit ihren 1000 Rädern, von der Millionen 
ihren Unterhalt finden, kann nicht lange stillstehen. Man kann nicht 1-2 Jahre hindurch 
mit 12tägigen Schlachten von Position zu Position rücken, bis die Kriegführenden gänz-
lich erschöpft und ermattet beide um Frieden bitten und beide sich den gestellten Be-
dingungen fügen. Wir müssen suchen, den Feind schnell niederzuwerfen und zu ver-
nichten.” On the other hand, Schlieffen defended the maintenance of large national ar-
mies, postulating that these armies were unassailable and a deterrent against attacks. See 
Alfred Graf von SCHLIEFFEN: “Über die Millionenheere”, SCHLIEFFEN: Gesammelte 
Schriften, edited by Hugo Freiherr von FREYTAG-LORINGHOVEN, vol. 1, Berlin: Mittler 
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Yet, Japanese political and military decisions were of significance not just 
to matters of land warfare in Eurasia, but also to naval issues. Already in 
1903, the German naval command (Reichsmarineamt) envisaged an attack 
by some then unspecified ‘yellow power’ on the Chinese territory of Qing-
dao, under German control since 1897, and demanded funds for the 
strengthening of defensive fortifications and the buildup of armed contin-
gents. In 1904, the command rejected the plan arguing that the German co-
lonial establishment would have to be economically self-sufficient, that the 
costs for building fortifications could only be paid from the dependency’s 
own budget and could not be shouldered by the Imperial government.169 In 
the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, however, the command debated 
the possibility of a naval attack on the territory. In an immediate response, 
the command considered the option of fortifying the docks to allow German 
warships to continue to use Qingdao port under the condition of a maritime 
attack. It specifically pointed to the possibility of a Japanese naval attack, 
similar to that on Port Arthur, as a potential war scenario.170 But by 1906, 
the command revised its stance and opted for minimal fortifications ‘ensur-
ing resistance against the most effective fire of siege artillery’.171 Conse-
quently, defense measures came to be scaled down to the deployment of 
cannon against a land-based attack from neighbouring territory under Chi-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
1913: 23–4 [English version, SCHLIEFFEN: Writings (note 156): 206–207; first published, 
Deutsche Revue (June 1911)]. 
169 Deutsches Reich, Reichsmarineamt: Report by Rear Admiral Geissler about a manoeu-
ver on 8 October 1903, Ms. Freiburg: BUNDESARCHIV–MILITÄRARCHIV RM 38/38 [part-
ly printed, Jork ARTELT: Tsingtau. Deutsche Stadt und Festung in China. 1897–1914, 
Düsseldorf: Droste 1984: 174–81]. Memorandum by Admiral von Ahlefeld on the fu-
ture fortifications of Kiaochow, dated April 1904, Ms. Freiburg: BUNDESARCHIV–MILI-
TÄRARCHIV RM 3/6911: fortifications can only be upgraded, “wenn Dock- und Hafen-
anlagen, Werft und Eisenbahn fertig sind, wenn die Kohleförderung im Hinterlande, 
Handel und Industrie den Platz zum Aufblühen gebracht haben.” [partly printed by AR-
TELT (as above): 190]. For further recent studies on Qingdao under German control see 
above, note 94. 
170 Deutsches Reich, Reichsmarineamt: Report by the Government of Kiaochow, 20 March 
1905, Ms. Freiburg: BUNDESARCHIV–MILITÄRARCHIV RM 3/6913: following the expe-
riences of the Japanese attack on Port Arthur it is to be expected, “dass alle die Anlagen, 
die der herauskommenden und unter Umständen durch Kampf beschädigten Flotte zur 
Wiederherstellung und dauernden Erhaltung der Gefechtsbereitschaft dienen sollen, sehr 
bald zerstört sein werden.” [partly printed by ARTELT: Tsingtau (note 169): 195]. 
171 Deutsches Reich, Reichsmarineamt: Report on the fortification of Tsingtau, 23 Novem-
ber 1906, Ms. Freiburg: BUNDESARCHIV–MILITÄRARCHIV RM 3/6914: 7: statement of 
the plan to secure the “Widerstandsfähigkeit gegen die wirksamsten Schussarten der 
Belagerungsartillerie” [partly printed by ARTELT: Tsingtau (note 169): 185]. 
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nese control.172 Qingdao port thus remained virtually unprotected against a 
naval attack, even though Japanese naval forces were considered a threat. 
In conclusion, the Meiji government, in its bid for recognition as a great 
power, based its reception of European ideologies of colonial rule not only 
on careful analysis but also upon ruthless assessments of its own interests. 
By contrast, the reception of the Japanese modification of European colonial 
ideologies back in Europe itself boosted misperceptions which, in turn, sup-
ported the formation of illusionary war plans. Contrary to the recognizable 
Japanese policy of grabbing opportunities as they came along, European 
military planning postulated the pursuit of some grand strategy as the plat-
form for Japanese policy of colonial expansion. In the European making, the 
perception of Japanese colonial rule as the outflow of some strategic design 
was, however, the product of a fanciful interpretation that, prior to World 
War I, had little in common with Japanese government intention. Japanese 
war-making capability was assessed solely in its impact on Russian war-
making capability but not in its effects on European positions in continental 
East Asia. Consequently, European military planning, at least until 1911, 
was based on serious miscalculations serious enough to induce German am-
bassador Graf von Rex to telegraph to Qingdao as late as on 9 August 1914 
the message that Japan would not move against the place.173 
 The Japanese Conception of Colonialism Without Empire 
In an article published in 1992, Peter Duus argued that Japanese ‘imperial-
ism’ was unique in not being accompanied by quests for ‘colonies’. Duus 
noted the reluctance displayed by Japanese governments between the 1870s 
and the end of World War II to explicitly refer as ‘colonies’ to the depend-
encies under their control. He did, of course, note that the Takumushō 拓務
省174 had been established in 1929 as an agency in charge of “development”. 
																																								 																				
172 Deutsches Reich, Reichsmarineamt: Report to the government of Kiaochow, January 
1908, Ms. Freiburg: BUNDESARCHIV–MILITÄRARCHIV RM 3/6914 [partly printed in: 
ARTELT: Tsingtau (note 169): 206–09]. 
173 Waldemar VOLLERTHUN: Der Kampf um Tsingtau. Eine Episode aus dem Weltkrieg 
1914/1918 nach Tagebuchblättern, Leipzig: Hirzel 1920: 32. Paul OSTWALD: Japans 
Entwicklung zur modernen Weltmacht, Bonn and Leipzig: Schroeder 1922 (Bücherei der 
Kultur und Geschichte, 28): 162. 
174 DUUS: “Shokuminchi” (note 78): 105–21. The avoidance of the ascription of the status 
of colonies to dependencies under the control of the Meiji government has remained 
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Duus argued that the establishment of the ministry had come late and under 
the aegis of the League of Nations Trusteeship regulations. Duus was right 
in classing the Japanese government use of colonialist terminology as reluc-
tant and pointing to the legacy of Pan-Asianism as the cause of that reluc-
tance. However, Duus failed to recognize that Japanese reluctance to use 
imperialist terminology in official diction was even stronger and more con-
sistently displayed than the reluctance to use colonialist terminology. Spe-
cifically, Japanese governments were unwilling to implement British impe-
rialist terminology, manifest in the title Empress of India conveyed upon 
Queen Victoria in 1877, and the use of the attribute imperial for institutions 
in charge of controlling the British Empire. The avoidance of imperial ter-
minology seems straightforward enough in view of the choice of the title 
“Empire” for Japan as a state. Yet by consequence, the Japanese concept of 
control over dependencies was relatable to a concept of empire merely in the 
European perception in which empires were equivalent of sets of territories 
and population groups in Africa, Asia and the South Pacific and subject to 
the control of a great power in Europe and North America. This perception, 
however, was not compatible with attitudes prevailing in Japan. As the Meiji 
government expanded its control beyond the confines of the borders of Japan 
as a state, it did so without a master plan equivalent of the expansionist pro-
gram that became explicit through the Final Act of the Berlin Africa Con-
																																								 																																							 																																							 																					
unnoticed in recent research in comparative colonialism; see Anne BOOTH and Kent 
DENG: “Japanese Colonialism in Comparative Perspective”, Journal of World History 
28 (2017): 61-98. Herfried MÜNKLER and Eva Marlene HAUSTEINER (eds): Die Legiti-
mation von Imperien, Frankfurt and New York: Campus 2012. The first government 
agency in charge, among others, of the administration of the Mandated Territories 
(Takumu Kyoku 拓務局) was established in 1922 but did not contain an explicit refe-
rence to colonialism in its name. Instead, its name reflected the developmentalist ap-
proach that was characteristic of British colonial administration, even though it came to 
be maintained in public only a decade or so later. See Donald CAMERON: Native 
Administration in Nigeria and Tanganyika, Hull: Brown 1937 (Journal of the Royal 
African Society, vol. 36, Supplement): 3, 17. For developmentalism informing Japanese 
colonial administration see HIRANO Yoshitarō 平野義太郎 and KIYONO Kenji 清野謙
次: Taiheiyō no minzoku seijigaku 太平洋の民族=政治学 (Political Anthropology of 
the South Seas), Nippon Hyōron Sha 日本評論社 1942: 234. For studies see SHIMIZU 
Akitoshi [清水昭俊]: “Anthropology and the Wartime Situation of the 1930s and 1940s. 
Masao OKA, Yoshitarō HIRANO, Eiichirō ISHIDA and Their Negotiations with the Situa-
tion”, in: Senri Ethnological Studies 65 (2003): 49–108. TOMIYAMA Ichirō [富山一郎]: 
“Colonialism and the Sciences of the Tropical Zone. The Academic Analysis of Differ-
ence in ‘the Island Peoples’”, Tani E. BARLOW (ed.): Formations of Colonial Modernity 
in East Asia, Durham: Duke University Press 1997: 199–221, at 207, 216–17. 
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ference of 1885.175 Instead, the Meiji and subsequently the Taishō govern-
ments pursued their expansionist policy of accomplishing the more 
far-reaching goal of obtaining recognition as a great power. In taking this 
stance, the Meiji government rejected the strategies of expansion of rule 
which Katō Hiroyuki as one of its closest advisors had recommended and, 
instead, employed a developmentalist approach. Only during the 1930s the 
expansion of Japanese government control beyond the confines of the archi-
pelago laid the grounds for offensive and oppressive policies, accompanied 
by government support for settler colonialism, thereby perverting the legacy 
of Pan-Asianism into an ideology of aggression in perversion of the 
Pan-Asianist principles that had guided previous governments. 
With regard to Japan, the reciprocal interactionistic study of the change of 
concepts and perceptions transferred across societies and cultures thus al-
lows the specification of the transformations that concepts and perceptions 
undergo as a result of transfers. These transfers do not take place along 
one-way roads. Concepts and perceptions that get transferred indeed have 
effects on receiving societies and cultures, as has long been noted.176 Yet, 
transfers also change the concepts and perceptions themselves, as the re-
ceiving societies and cultures have both the authority and capability of han-
dling the incoming perceptions and concepts in accordance with their own 
norms, values, patterns of action, goals and agenda, even when the transfers 
occur under diplomatic pressure and the threat of deployment or actual use 
of military force. The transfer to Japan of the European and North American 
concepts and perceptions constituting colonial rule as a manifestation of 
great-power status, occurred between the early 1850s and the late 1890s 
under precisely these conditions. Having been swept into office through a 
revolutionary process of the change of state structure during the winter of 
1867/68, the new Meiji government began its tenure with the public declara-
tion of its commitment to honor ‘the universal public law’ that appeared to 
be valid as non-statutory law and was positioned above stipulations laid 
																																								 																				
175 Final Act of the Berlin Africa Conference, 26 February 1885, CTS, vol. 165 (1981): 
485–502; also, Robert J. GAVIN and J. A. BETLEY (eds): The Scramble for Africa. 
Documents on the Berlin African Conference and Related Subjects. 1884–1885, Ibadan: 
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down in written texts. The Meiji government came to understand, at the lat-
est by 1873,177 that the notion of ‘universal public law’, having had wide 
areas of overlap with the traditional European notion of natural law, no 
longer featured within the then current legal concepts and perceptions of its 
treaty partners in Europe and North America. Instead, these treaty partners 
had, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, adopted new principles. 
First, international law was to be agreed upon and enforced within some 
“international legal community”. Second, membership in this “community” 
was not regarded as a given. Third, new members had to receive recognition 
as “civilized” through acts of grace granted by existing members. Moreover, 
the Meiji government further understood that, within the “international legal 
community”, there was a privileged group of states termed great powers and 
seen as equipped with the capability of conducting ‘world politics’, under-
pinned by control over dependencies. It had to acknowledge that the existing 
treaties had not been based on ‘universal public law’, but on the specific 
legal framework of the European public law of treaties among states and that 
the latter framework was employed to the end of denying equal rights to 
Japan as a treaty partner. In response to this understanding, the Meiji gov-
ernment kicked off the hasty and often harsh process of the transformation of 
state institutions as well as cultural, economic, military, political and social 
features with the explicitly stated goal of manifesting its status as the gov-
ernment of a legally equal sovereign state.178 The Meiji government took 
great care to select those features for the transformation process that its Eu-
ropean and North American treaty partners included into what they termed 
“civilization”. The “Constitution” as “something enumerating the rights and 
duties of rulers and the ruled”,179 formally ranked the state as an “Empire”, 
thereby stipulating the use of the imperial terminology in official references 
to the state and its institutions in pronouncements made out in European 
languages. The Meiji government also took over the perception that states as 
members of the “international legal community” should conform to some 
standard of alleged “civilization”. And it finally adopted the perception that, 
within the “international legal community” with Japan as a member, there 
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was the group of privileged great powers in control of colonial dependencies. 
In these three respects, the concepts and perceptions of European prove-
nance underwent significant transformations as they became transferred into 
Japan. The European concept according to which states could have empires 
as their claimed possessions turned into the concept according to which Ja-
pan as a state was an “Empire”. The perception of “civilization” as the 
benchmark which members of the “international legal community” had to 
meet was transformed into the perception of “civilization” as an instrument 
to accomplish the legal equality of states. And the perception that colonial 
rule was the privilege of self-appointed great powers within the “internation-
al legal community”, was converted into the perception that the expansion of 
colonial rule was a condition for the recognition of great-power status. Eu-
ropean and North American governments as well as their intellectual advi-
sors noted these transformations of concepts and perceptions in consequence 
of their transfer to Japan, but refrained from analysing them carefully. When 
it came to practically assess the kind of response the Japanese government 
would pursue in the event of a wide-ranging European military conflict, 
military planners in Europe, instead of seeking to acquire reliable and de-
tailed knowledge about Japanese strategic planning, confined themselves to 
imposing upon Japan some grand strategy of the expansion of colonial rule, 
seen as targeted at Northeast Asia, and reiterated Japanese propaganda rather 
than presenting careful analysis: “The spirit dominating the Japanese all 
through was a concentrated and passionate determination to win at all 
costs.”180 Hence, the Meiji and Taishō governments had a reasonably pre-
cise understanding of how the world, as represented by their treaty partners, 
was looking at Japan. But the world, seeing through the spectacles of Euro-
pean and North American governments, hardly understood how Japan was 
looking at the world. 
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